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Abstract
My dissertation consists in three empirical studies on income mobility and wage growth.
In the first chapter I compare short run income mobility between the North and South of Italy.
Using the panel of the Survey on Household Income and Wealth for the period 2004-2008, I
show that individuals from the South face a worse income dynamic than those from the North
even when accounting for age and education. I use a nonparametric one-sided test for comparing
conditional transition probabilities with a continuous covariate. The test is based on covariate
matching techniques, does not assume any functional form for the dependence of the transition
probability on the covariate, allows for different sample design and has a pivotal distribution.
In the second chapter I use Italian administrative data to study the effect of adverse labor market
entry conditions on wage mobility of young males. I compare wage transition matrices between
individuals who entered the labor market in the higher unemployment period 1986-1988 and
those who entered in the lower unemployment period 1990-1992. I use a nonparametric testing
procedure. I find that individuals who enter during the high unemployment period face a worse
long run income mobility and in particular have significantly lower probabilities of reaching the
top class of the wage distribution. I argue that Italy has a static labor market with a high cost
of changing job. This reduces the opportunity of individuals to improve their working status,
leading to a negative persistent effect of adverse entry conditions.
In the third chapter I investigate the returns to internal migration for Italian young males. Using
Italian administrative data I find a significant positive effect on wage growth in the first eleven
years of career when individuals migrate towards North in the first five years of career. On the
other hand I find a significant negative effect on the wage of the first year following migration
when the destination is South. I show that it is essential to consider the destination and the
timing when studying returns to migration.
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Chapter 1
Comparing conditional transition
probabilities: Is Italian Income
Mobility Region Specific?
1.1 Introduction
It is well known that Italy is characterized by an important economic difference between the
North and the South, with the first richer, more industrially developed and fast growing. Our
application tests whether this difference have also an impact on the individuals’ short run income
mobility. More specifically, the empirical question is if an individual from the South of Italy
has the same chances to improve/worsen her social condition than an individual from the North
in the short run, where the social condition is given by her position on the national income
distribution.
In order to answer the question, we compare the conditional transition matrices of the two
regions for the period 2004-2008 using the panel of the Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) database by Bank of Italy. In the analysis, we take into account age and education.
Not considering the regional age structure when studying short run income mobility could lead
to misleading results: it is in fact well known that income mobility varies during individuals’
life time, being highest at the beginning of the working career. A similar reasoning can be
done for education: it is expected that individuals with higher education face a more positive
income dynamic. Besides, education can be seen as the channel through which individuals can
increase their possibilities of improving their income dynamic and make it more independent
1
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of the economic environment they live in1. A partial answer to our question can be indirectly
found in Cappellari [2004] whom analyzes Italian workers’ transition probabilities of leaving or
entering the low wage class through a parametric model. However, in his analysis, he does not
take into account individuals’ age as a continuous covariate (he includes a dummy for more that
30 years potential labor market) and the analysis concerns only one class of income. We do not
know any other work that compares North and South Italian short run income mobility.
The results of our analysis show a situation in which individuals of similar age and education
face a more positive income dynamics in the North than in the South of Italy. In particular
these differences are found in the poorest part of the population and the richest. Inside a unique
country such as differences have consequences in terms of welfare (e.g. Boeri and Brandolini
[2005]), affect individuals’ economic decisions such as migration (e.g. see Mocetti and Porello
[2010] for an analysis on the recent dynamics of Italian labor mobility) and should be considered
by government’s policies (e.g. Cappellari [2004]).
In the literature, conditional transition probabilities with continuous covariates are generally
studied through parametric models such as linear probability models or probit. The first type of
models cannot be used to compare the conditional probability overall the covariate support. For
the probit, Bhattacharya and Mazumder [2011] point out that such as type of models are not
adequate from a theoretical point of view ”...because it is unclear what type of joint distribution
of errors will imply a probit form for transition probabilities; in particular, a bivariate normal
error distribution will not...”; besides they show that a probit analysis gives them misleading
results in their empirical application. For these reasons a nonparametric test would be more
adequate.
While comparing conditional transition probabilities with discrete covariates (e.g. education)
can be done splitting the sample in classes reducing the analysis to an unconditional comparison
and apply the results by Formby et al. [2004], the problem becomes more involved when the
covariates are continuous (e.g. age). We introduce a methodology that was never applied in this
context. We extend some of the tools available in literature for the comparison of two samples
regression functions to the case of conditional transition probabilities. In fact, the comparison
of conditional transition probabilities can be seen as the comparison of regression curves where
the transition probability is the dependent variable. If the regression curves of the two groups
coincide overall the common support of the covariate, we say they are the same. The same
applies if the conditional transition probabilities coincide overall the support of the covariate.
In the statistical literature, several papers addressed the problem of testing the equality of two
regression functions against two-sided alternatives: see e.g. Ha¨rdle and Marron [1990], Hall and
1Individuals with higher education have more working opportunities and can choose among them. The fact of
having a choice makes individuals more independent from the economic environment compared to others that do
not have any.
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Hart [1990], King et al. [1991], Delgado [1993], Neumeyer and Dette [2003] and Ferreira and
Stute [2004] among others. Some of them use covariates matching techniques for the purpose:
see e.g. Hall and Turlach [1997], Cabus [1998], Pardo-Ferna´ndez et al. [2007] or Srihera and
Stute [2010]. One-sided alternatives where considered by Hall et al. [1997], Koul and Schick
[1997, 2003], Neumeyer and Pardo-Ferna´ndez [2009]. Among these, the last paper proposes a
test based on the regressions residuals, while the others present tests based on covariate matching
techniques.
We introduce an intuitive tests to study the hypothesis of equal conditional transition probabili-
ties between two samples against a one-sided alternative. The test is based on the work of Cabus
[1998], Koul and Schick [1997, 2003] and Neumeyer and Dette [2003] and allow for a continuous
covariate with a possibly different distribution and support in the two samples. The test do not
assume any functional form for the dependence of the transition probability on the covariate
and it has a pivotal asymptotic distribution. The test is simple, intuitive and give reasonable
good performances even with limited sample sizes. The test relies on the assumption that the
two conditional probability curves do not cross over the common support.
A nonparametric two-sided test for comparing conditional transition probabilities could be de-
rived using the work of Cabus [1998] and Neumeyer [2004]. Such as two-sided test would be
more general and would not rely on the non crossing assumption of the conditional probability
curves. On the other side it would require empirical processes techniques and a bootstrap pro-
cedure in order to be implemented, and a larger number of observations than the one-sided test
for obtaining a similar power.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we first introduce the testing methodology in
Section 2; we derive its asymptotic properties and run a Monte Carlo simulation in Section 3.
We apply it to our empirical question in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
1.2 Test statistic and asymptotics
We consider two independent samples of iid observations and size n1 and n2 respectively. Each
observation is the realization of a triple of random variables
{
Y
(s)
i0 , Y
(s)
i1 , X
(s)
i
}
, where s = 1, 2,
is the sample index and i = 1, ..., ns is the unit index.
We define the conditional transition probability p(s)(C0, C1, x) = Pr[Y
(s)
1 ∈ C1|Y (s)0 ∈ C0, X(s) = x]
as the probability of the random variable Y (s) to pass from a determined state C0 in period
zero to another state C1 in period one, given to be in state C0 in period zero and the covariate
X(s) = x. We write it:
p(s)(C0, C1, x) =
Π(s)(C0, C1, x)
Π(s)(C0, x)
, (1.1)
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where Π(s)(C0, C1, x) = Pr[Y
(s)
1 ∈ C1, Y (s)0 ∈ C0|X(s) = x] is the joint probability of variable
Y (s) to be in state C0 in period zero and in state C1 in period one given X = x and Π
(s)(C0, x) =
Pr[Y
(s)
0 ∈ C0|X(s) = x] is the probability of Y (s) being in state C0 given X(s) = x. We allow
X(s) to be distributed differently in the two samples following densities f (s)(x) for s = 1, 2. We
assume f (s)(x) to be differentiable of order two and bounded away from zero on the common
support I for s = 1, 2. We also assume Π(s)(C0, C1, x) and Π
(s)(C0, x) to be differentiable
functions of X. The classes C0 and C1 are exogenously determined.
We test the null hypothesis of equality of conditional transition probabilities on the common
support I:
H0 : p
(1)(C0, C1, x) = p
(2)(C0, C1, x) ∀ x ∈ I; (1.2)
against the alternative:
H1 : p
(1)(C0, C1, x) ≥ p(2)(C0, C1, x) for all x ∈ I with strict inequality for at least (1.3)
a subset of positive measure of x ∈ I
We can characterize the null and the alternative hypothesis through the integral:
γ =
∫ [
Π(1)(C0, C1, x¯)Π
(2)(C0, x¯)−Π(2)(C0, C1, x¯)Π(1)(C0, x¯)
]
fX(1)(x¯)fX(2)(x¯)dx¯ (1.4)
Under the null hypothesis γ is zero, while it is positive under the alternative.
It should be noticed that the consistency of the test is based on the assumption that the two
conditional transition probability curves do not cross overall the common support of the covari-
ate. Such as assumption can be sustained in our application with the following reasoning: if the
regional economic environment does affect the income mobility of the individuals living in it,
this effect should have the same direction for all the individuals, no matter their age. Another
natural context in which this assumption can be sustained is in the treatment effect literature,
where it is assumed the treatment has a specific directional effect overall the covariate support:
e.g. the effect of a training program on the probability of being employed should be positive no
matter the age of the individuals that participate to the program.
We estimate γ by:
γn1n2 =
1
n1n2
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
[
1{Y (1)i0 ∈ C0}1{Y (1)i1 ∈ C1}1{Y (2)j0 ∈ C0} (1.5)
−1{Y (2)j0 ∈ C0}1{Y (2)j1 ∈ C1}1{Y (1)i0 ∈ C0}
]
× 1
h
k
(
X
(1)
i −X(2)j
h
)
.
Under standard assumptions in literature and using the results of Neumeyer [2004] it can be
shown that both under the null and the alternative hypothesis, γn1n2 is an unbiased estimator
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of γ and √
n1n2
n1 + n2
(γn1n2 − γ) d−→ N(0, σ2).
Since the test statistics converges to a normal distribution both under the null and under the
alternative, the test is consistent (e.g. see Theorem 3.3.1 in Lehmann [1999]) and we can use
the t-statistic:
tn1n2 =
γn1n2
σˆ0/
√
n1n2
n1+n2
, (1.6)
to conduct the one-sided test of H0 against H1, where
σˆ20 = (1− ρ)
1
n1
n1∑
i
[
Πˆ(1)(C0, C1, X
(1)
i )Πˆ
(2)(C0, X
(1)
i )
2 + Πˆ(1)(C0, X
(1)
i )Πˆ
(2)(C0, C1, X
(1)
i )
2
−2Πˆ(1)(C0, C1, X(1)i )Πˆ(2)(C0, X(1)i )Πˆ(2)(C0, C1, X(1)i )
]
fˆ (2)(X
(1)
i )
2 (1.7)
+ ρ
1
n2
n2∑
j
[
Πˆ(1)(C0, C1, X
(2)
j )
2Πˆ(2)(C0, X
(2)
j ) + Πˆ
(1)(C0, X
(2)
j )
2Πˆ(2)(C0, C1, X
(2)
j )
−2Πˆ(1)(C0, C1, X(2)j )Πˆ(1)(C0, X(2)j )Πˆ(2)(C0, C1, X(2)j )
]
fˆ (1)(X
(2)
j )
2
and f (s)(x), Π(s)(C0, x), Π
(s)(C0, C1, x) are estimated as follows for s = 1, 2 respectively:
fˆ (s)(z) =
1
nsh(s)
ns∑
j=1
k
(
z −X(s)j
h(s)
)
(1.8)
Πˆ(s)(C0, z) =
1
nsh(s)fˆ (s)(z)
ns∑
j=1
1{Y (s)j0 ∈ C0}k
(
z −X(s)j
h(s)
)
(1.9)
Πˆ(s)(C0, C1, z) =
1
nsh(s)fˆ (s)(z)
ns∑
j=1
1{Y (s)j0 ∈ C0}1{Y (s)j1 ∈ C1}k
(
z −X(s)j
h(s)
)
, (1.10)
with s = 1, 2 and h(s) satisfy Nadaraya Watson estimator assumptions.
Assuming a specific local alternative, it would be possible to derive a most powerful one-sided
test modifying the weighting function w(x¯), e.g. Koul and Schick [2003], Neumeyer and Pardo-
Ferna´ndez [2009]. However, to assume a local alternative is beyond the scope of the paper.
1.2.1 The unconditional test
If the transition probability does not depend on any covariate, the null hypothesis becomes
H0 : p
(1)(C0, C1)− p(2)(C0, C1) = 0,
against the alternative
H1 : p
(1)(C0, C1)− p(2)(C0, C1) > 0;
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where p(s)(C0, C1) is the unconditional transition probability from class C0 to C1.
Define:
Πˆ(s)(C0) =
1
ns
ns∑
j=1
1{Y (s)j0 ∈ C0}
Πˆ(s)(C0, C1) =
1
ns
ns∑
j=1
1{Y (s)j0 ∈ C0}1{Y (s)j1 ∈ C1}
pˆ(s)(C0, C1) =
Πˆ(s)(C0, C1)
Πˆ(s)(C0)
;
where Πˆ(s)(C0, C1) is the estimated joint probability of variable Y
(s) to be in state C0 in period
zero and in state C1 in period one, Πˆ
(s)(C0) is the estimated probability of Y
(s) being in state
C0 and pˆ
(s)(C0, C1) is the estimated unconditional transition probability.
Assuming sample independence and n1/N → ρ ∈ (0, 1) as N →∞, it can be shown that under
H0: √
n1n2
n1 + n2
(
pˆ(1)(C0, C1)− pˆ(2)(C0, C1)
)
d→ N(0, σ2u),
with
σ2u =(1− ρ)
[(
1
Π(1)(C0)
)2
Π(1)(C0, C1)(1−Π(1)(C0, C1)) +
(
Π(1)(C0, C1)
(Π(1)(C0))2
)2
×Π(1)(C0)(1−Π(1)(C0, C1)) + 2
Π(1)(C0)
Π(1)(C0, C1)
(Π(1)(C0))2
Π(1)(C0, C1)(1−Π(1)(C0))
]
+ ρ
[(
1
Π(2)(C0)
)2
Π(2)(C0, C1)(1−Π(2)(C0, C1)) +
(
Π(2)(C0, C1)
(Π(2)(C0))2
)2
×Π(2)(C0)(1−Π(2)(C0, C1)) + 2
Π(2)(C0)
Π(2)(C0, C1)
(Π(2)(C0))2
Π(2)(C0, C1)(1−Π(2)(C0))
]
,
The unconditional t-statistic is:
tu =
pˆ(1)(C0, C1)− pˆ(2)(C0, C1)
σˆu/
√
n1n2
n1+n2
. (1.11)
which can be compared to the critical values given by the standard normal distribution in order
to reject or not the null hypothesis.
When considering conditional transition probabilities, if the covariate X(s), s = 1, 2, is categori-
cal with L common categories x ∈ {x1, x2, ..., xL}, a way of testing the equality between the two
conditional transition probabilities is by splitting the sample in the covariate categories and run
an unconditional test inside each subsample separately. If the sample is split, the covariate is a
constant in each subsample and it does not need to be considered when comparing the transition
probability between the two samples. In this framework the unconditional test is adequate. How-
ever splitting the sample in the covariate categories and run the unconditional test is not optimal
to test the equality between the transition probability uniformly on the covariate categories. It
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is not optimal for testing the null hypothesis H0 : p
(1)(C0, C1, x = xl) = p
(2)(C0, C1, x = xl) for
all x1, x2, ..., xL, against the alternative H1 : p
(1)(C0, C1, x = xl) ≥ p(2)(C0, C1, x = xl) for all
x1, ..., xL with strict inequality for at least one common category xl. In this case a joint test over
the covariate categories is needed. This because testing each subsample separately and pooling
the results to test the equality of the transition probability uniformly on the covariate categories
would result in a sequential testing procedure where the asymptotic size is out of control. A
possible way of testing the joint null hypothesis would be by means of a χ2 test, which is a
two-sided test and straightforward when the transition probability depends on one categorical
covariate only.
In our analysis on income mobility we compare conditional transition probabilities before consid-
ering individuals’ age and then considering age and education. In the first analysis we consider
age as continuous and use our nonparametric one-sided test, while in the second analysis we split
the sample into the categories high education and low education and run our nonparametric test
in the two separate subsamples without pooling the results to obtain a join test for the two edu-
cation categories. As we describe in details next Section, the choice is motivated by the fact that
it is economically interesting to consider the two education categories as different populations.
In order to obtain a joint test for both education categories, we could discretize age in classes
and run a χ2 test using the two discrete variables age and education. Discretizing age would also
allow to use the χ2 test in the analysis in which we consider only education. However, in our
empirical analysis we have too few observation available for discretizing age and split the sample
in both age and education classes and we leave this approach for more appropriate empirical
applications.
1.3 Monte Carlo simulation
We run a Monte Carlo with a 1000 simulation. We tailor the simulation to the case of conditional
transition probabilities, which is a novelty in the literature on the testing of the equality of
regressions functions. Following Neumeyer and Dette [2003] and Srihera and Stute [2010] we
take the bandwidths:
h =
(
n1σˆ
2
1 + n2σˆ
2
2
(n1 + n2)2
) 7
24
and h(s) =
(
σˆ2s
ns
) 1
5
,
for the estimation of γn1n2(C0, C1;x) and of f
(s)(x), Π(s)(C0, x), Π
(s)(C0, C1, x), for s = 1, 2,
respectively. We take as σˆs sample s covariate X standard deviation.
Since the transition probability is the probability of passing to class C1 being in class C0 and the
value of X, we can consider modelling it with a binary response model where the index variable
characterizes the transition from one class to the other and depends on the covariate. In all the
scenarios presented, we studied the conditional transition probability of Y (s) being below the
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median of the set [Y
(1)
0i
⋃
Y
(2)
0j ] in the first period and above the median of the set [Y
(1)
1i
⋃
Y
(2)
1j ]
in the second period, with i = 1, ..., n1 and j = 1, ..., n2.
We generate Y
(s)
0 to be log-normal and X
(s) to be in the interval [0,1]. Then, for those observa-
tions with the value of Y
(s)
0 below the median in the first period, we generate the index variable
that represents the transition to be above the median next period as:
d
(s)
i =
{
1 b0 + b
(s)
x X
(s)
i ≥ −ei
0 otherwise
where e ∼ N(0, 1) and b0, b(s)x change when imposing the null hypothesis or the alternative. b0
is obtained in order to have around half of d
(s)
i = 1, i = 1, ..., ns. Given this setup, sample 1 and
sample 2 share the same conditional transition probability if the coefficient b
(s)
x is the same for
s = 1, 2.
In simulation (i) and (ii) we impose the null.
Simulation (i) is the simplest case we consider: b
(1)
x = b
(2)
x = 1 and the marginals are the same
in the two samples: Y
(1)
0 ∼ Y (2)0 ∼ exp(u) where u ∼ N(0, 1) and X(1) ∼ X(2) ∼ U(0, 1).
In (ii) b
(1)
x = b
(2)
x = 0.7. Y
(2)
0 has higher average and variance than Y
(1)
0 and X
(1) has a lower
average than X(2): Y
(1)
0 ∼ exp(u), Y (2)0 ∼ exp(u∗) where u ∼ N(0, 1) and u∗ ∼ N(1, (1.5)2);
X(1) ∼ N(0.3, (0.4)2)× 1[0≤X(1)≤1] and X(2) ∼ N(0.8, (0.4)2)× 1[0≤X(2)≤1]
In simulation (iii) and (iv) we impose the alternative.
In (iii) the marginals are the same in the two samples and distributed as in (i), but b
(s)
x are
different: b
(1)
x = 1, b
(2)
x = 0.2.
In (iv) Y
(s)
0 is equal for s = 1, 2 and distributed as in (i), while X
(1) ∼ N(0.2, (0.4)2)×1[0≤X(1)≤1]
and X(2) ∼ N(0.8, (0.4)2)× 1[0≤X(2)≤1]. Besides, b(1)x = 1 and b(2)x = 0.5.
The results of the simulation are presented in Table 1.1(a) while in Table 1.1(b) there are
those of the unconditional test for simulations (ii) and (iv) respectively. The test performs
properly both under the null and the alternative, even with sample sizes smaller than 200
observations. The unconditional test is over-sized under the null hypothesis in (ii) and has a quite
low power under the alternative in (iv) in Table 1.1(b). Simulations (ii) and (iv) are examples
of situations in which it would be misleading to use the unconditional test. In these simulations
the marginal distributions of the variables compensate the coefficients of X in order to obtain
different unconditional transition probabilities under the null in (ii) and similar unconditional
transition probabilities under the alternative in (iv).
1.4 Italian regional income mobility
Income mobility is often studied by means of transition matrices containing the transition prob-
abilities of passing from a class of the income distribution to another during the analyzed period.
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Table 1.1: Simulation results for the one-sided test.
(a) Imposing the Null and the Alternative Through a Probit
n1 50 100 200 1000
n2 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1%
50 0.109 0.052 0.003 0.105 0.058 0.013 0.091 0.051 0.007 0.113 0.064 0.015
i 100 0.099 0.042 0.003 0.122 0.058 0.009 0.113 0.061 0.011 0.112 0.054 0.012
200 0.094 0.050 0.015 0.106 0.047 0.011 0.112 0.060 0.013 0.100 0.054 0.015
1000 0.122 0.065 0.015 0.120 0.059 0.005 0.105 0.048 0.014 0.108 0.053 0.011
50 0.113 0.053 0.003 0.113 0.061 0.003 0.088 0.035 0.007 0.106 0.052 0.008
ii 100 0.103 0.050 0.010 0.101 0.044 0.009 0.105 0.056 0.011 0.101 0.048 0.011
200 0.107 0.049 0.007 0.097 0.041 0.004 0.099 0.044 0.006 0.118 0.052 0.009
1000 0.089 0.047 0.014 0.104 0.053 0.010 0.095 0.052 0.013 0.124 0.063 0.015
50 0.434 0.279 0.073 0.506 0.351 0.111 0.510 0.366 0.125 0.591 0.448 0.185
iii 100 0.499 0.348 0.105 0.606 0.475 0.201 0.699 0.554 0.282 0.789 0.660 0.395
200 0.530 0.391 0.161 0.698 0.557 0.268 0.811 0.704 0.420 0.943 0.899 0.711
1000 0.582 0.433 0.197 0.792 0.690 0.404 0.948 0.901 0.706 0.999 0.999 0.997
50 0.211 0.102 0.015 0.238 0.137 0.024 0.263 0.170 0.035 0.286 0.165 0.038
iv 100 0.238 0.130 0.030 0.286 0.164 0.037 0.336 0.211 0.059 0.376 0.248 0.079
200 0.264 0.148 0.038 0.316 0.205 0.069 0.377 0.242 0.093 0.509 0.376 0.145
1000 0.297 0.181 0.050 0.338 0.234 0.084 0.532 0.378 0.153 0.820 0.718 0.469
(b) Unconditional Test’s Results
n1 50 100 200 1000
n2 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1%
50 0.219 0.110 0.029 0.221 0.112 0.023 0.240 0.135 0.033 0.243 0.125 0.032
ii 100 0.241 0.126 0.038 0.212 0.126 0.021 0.228 0.107 0.025 0.225 0.133 0.040
200 0.208 0.101 0.029 0.206 0.121 0.033 0.244 0.131 0.035 0.250 0.140 0.037
1000 0.231 0.118 0.041 0.258 0.153 0.031 0.269 0.137 0.036 0.340 0.213 0.064
50 0.215 0.100 0.027 0.217 0.113 0.029 0.236 0.126 0.027 0.226 0.120 0.027
iv 100 0.227 0.127 0.045 0.198 0.113 0.020 0.200 0.095 0.017 0.220 0.122 0.025
200 0.206 0.104 0.027 0.198 0.118 0.023 0.221 0.105 0.021 0.217 0.114 0.026
1000 0.196 0.107 0.033 0.222 0.124 0.027 0.200 0.105 0.028 0.208 0.105 0.027
Rejection probabilities obtained with a 1000 simulations; the null and the alternative are imposed as
described in section 2 and the results are given for various sample size.
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We compare these transition probabilities between North and South of Italy, taking into account
first just age and then also education, using our test.
Given the differences in the economic environment they live in, we would expect individuals
from the North to face a more positive income mobility than those from the South. In terms
of transition matrices, we would expect the transition probabilities above the diagonal of the
matrix to be higher in the North than in the South, while those below the diagonal to be lower.
Although this outcome is predictable, it could be just the result of a different age or education
structure inside the two regions. Differences in transition probabilities become relevant if present
between individuals with similar age and education.
We use the Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) database by Bank of Italy2.
The units of analysis are those individuals belonging to the active population: employed, self-
employed, unemployed. The yearly income is obtained as the sum of employed income, transfers
and self employed income. We consider period 2004-2008, the most recent data available in the
SHIW. Similar length periods were considered by Cappellari [2004] and Boeri and Brandolini
[2005] in the study of short run income mobility. The transition matrices of the two regions
have common exogenous boundaries: the classes of income are obtained from the total national
distribution of the active population (also region Center is considered for obtaining the total
national distribution). The Regions are determined following the definition in variable ”area3”
of the SHIW. There is not immigration in the panel. After polishing the data 3, the final panel
for the whole Italy consists of 2347 individuals; 1156 are individuals from the North, 701 are
from the South.
Figure 1.1 presents the national distribution of income for the active part of the Italian popu-
lation and compare North and South’s distribution in years 2004 and 2008. From the graphs it
can be seen that the disposable individual income increased in the period and that the North’s
distributions slightly dominates the South’s both years. Figure 1.1(d) shows the 2004 age distri-
bution for the first class of income in the two regions: the two distributions look quite different
indicating that age must be taken into account when comparing transition probabilities. The
above observations are confirmed by Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix, where we report the
descriptive statistics of the variables and the national quantiles used to form the classes in the
following analysis.
We report the estimated 3x3 income transition matrices for North and South in Tables 1.2(a) and
(b) respectively. Table 1.2(c) presents the differences between the two regions (North-South).
The number of classes guarantees a reasonable number of observations in each cell and power
2See Faiella and Gambacorta [2007] for a description of the database
3We excluded from the panel individuals with negative income or inconsistent age. Further we trimmed the
top 0.5% of the national income distribution in the two years before merging the panel in order to avoid outliers.
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(a) North and South 2004 Income Distribution. (b) North and South 2008 Income Distribution.
(c) National Income Distribution. (d) North and South 2004 Age Distribution.
Figure 1.1: Comparison of income and age distributions
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using the
panel sample. Distributions are obtained through kernel estimation using the Gaussian kernel
and rule of thumb bandwidth.
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to the test4. The number of observations for each starting class is presented in the last column
of Tables 1.2(a) and (b). The sign of the differences in Table 1.2(c) are, in general, as expected:
negative below the diagonal and positive above. This means the probabilities of worsening the
income class are higher in the South, while those of improving are higher in the North. The
diagonal contains the probabilities of not changing class. For class 1, the poorest, the probability
is higher in the South while for class 3 it is higher in the North. In conclusion, it seems that
individuals from the North faced a more positive income mobility, with higher probabilities to
improve the income class and to stay at the top class, and lower probabilities to worsen the
class or to stay in the poorest. Next, we are going to test if these differences are statistically
significant taking into account the age structure of the two regions.
Table 1.2: Unconditional Transition Probabilities.
(a) Prob. North
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.66 0.22 0.13 326
1/3-2/3 0.28 0.48 0.24 416
>2/3 0.11 0.20 0.69 414
(b) Prob. South
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.75 0.15 0.10 279
1/3-2/3 0.28 0.47 0.25 232
>2/3 0.20 0.24 0.56 190
(c) North-South
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 -0.09 0.07 0.02
1/3-2/3 0.00 0.02 -0.02
>2/3 -0.09 -0.04 0.13
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using the
panel.
In the matrices, the classes in 2004 are in rows, those of 2008 in column. e.g. row <1/3
contains the transition probabilities of those individuals who were in the lowest class of
income in 2004.
1.4.1 Analysis considering age
Table 1.3(a) reports the results of our test. The test is run on the common support of age
using the Epanechnikov kernel and the same bandwidths as in the Monte Carlo simulations. We
multiplied the bandwidths by a constant in order to check the robustness of the results. We
considered the following values for the constant wh = {0.5, 1, 2, 5, 8}. The results are stable. We
present the results for wh = 5. Since the test is one-sided we run it in the direction given by the
economic intuition of income mobility being more positive for the individuals from the North.
For the transition probabilities below the diagonal of the transition matrix and the probability
of remaining in class 1 of the income distribution, we consider the null hypothesis of equality
against the one-sided alternative of North’s conditional probability being lower than the South
at least for some age. For the transition probabilities above the diagonal of the transition matrix
4A similar choice was done in Cappellari [2004] where one of the chosen thresholds for the low wage class was
the third decile of the wage distribution.
Chapter 1. Comparing conditional transition probabilities 13
and the probabilities of staying in class 2 and 3, we consider the one-sided alternative of North’s
conditional probability being higher than the South at least for some age. Notice that this
economic intuition is supported by the sign of the differences in 1.2(c).
The test rejects the null of equality at 5% significant level for the probabilities in the first and
third rows of the matrix, while it does not for the second. This means that individuals from the
South that were in the poorest class of the income distribution in 2004 faced significantly lower
probabilities to pass to the second or third class in 2008 compared to individuals from the North
with a similar age. On the other hand, individuals from the South that were in the third class in
2004 faced a higher probability of being in class 2 or 1 than individuals from the North with a
similar age. The test does not reject the null of equality for individuals that where in the middle
class in 2004. We conclude that, as expected, individuals from the North faced a significantly
more positive income mobility than individuals from the South. Table 1.3(b) presents the results
Table 1.3: Conditional test of the differences between North and South transition probabilities.
(a) One-sided p-values
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.000 0.000 0.023
1/3-2/3 0.502 0.221 0.809
>2/3 0.000 0.046 0.000
(b) Probit p-values
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.003 0.025 0.071
1/3-2/3 0.485 0.417 0.397
>2/3 0.004 0.040 0.000
The null is equality between North and South transition probabilities. The direction of the alterna-
tive for the one-sided test is given by the economic intuition of individuals from the North having
a more positive income mobility than those from the South. Intuition supported by the sign of the
difference North-South in Table 1.2(c). The numbers contained in the cells are the p-values.
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using the panel.
obtained when the above hypotheses were tested by means of a standard probit methodology.
When a parametric model such as the probit is used, the above test reduces in testing linear
restrictions on the estimated parameters. We estimated the following probit for the transition
probabilities:
p(C0, C1, x) = Φ
(
β0 + β1N ×Age+ β1S ×Age× d(S) + β2 ×Age2
)
which is the one that overall best fits the data.5 The null hypothesis of equality of transition
matrices between North and South in the probit model becomes H0 : β1S = 0. The results in
Table 1.3(b) confirm those obtained with our nonparametric test.
We highlighted above that the one-sided test is consistent only under the assumption the two
transition probability curves do not cross on the covariate support. To check if the non-crossing
assumption is satisfied, we estimated the conditional transition curves for each cell of the tran-
sition matrix and report them in Figure A.1 in Appendix. The non-crossing assumption seems
to be satisfied for the transition from class 1 to 3. The non-crossing assumption seems to not
5The estimated models can be seen in Table A.3 in Appendix. We tried several model specification, and the
one we propose is the one that fits the data the best. In particular we excluded a specification with the interaction
term between age squared and the dummy for the South because never significant in any transition probability.
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hold for the transition from class 3 to 2. However, the fact that the null hypothesis is rejected
indicates that the weighted average of the probability of passing from class 3 to 2 is higher in the
South, where the weights are determined by the density functions of age in the two samples. The
one-sided test is not adequate to test the transition probabilities in the second row of the matrix
because the non-crossing assumption is not satisfied and the null hypothesis is not rejected.
Next we apply our methodology to compare upward and downward transition probabilities be-
tween the two regions. We define upward probability as the individual’s probability of improving
her social position: to be in an higher class next period. We define downwards probability as
the probability of worsening the social position. We estimate and test up/downwards tran-
sition probabilities for the 3 classes analyzed above. The results of the test are presented in
Table 1.4: Testing Upwards and Downwards Conditional Transition Probabilities.
UP DOWN
North South North-South Test North South North-South Test
<1/3 0.34 0.25 0.09 0.000 - - - -
1/3-2/3 0.24 0.25 -0.02 0.809 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.502
>2/3 - - - - 0.31 0.44 -0.13 0.000
The tables report the probabilities for the two regions, their difference and the p-value of the tests. The null
is equality between North and South transition probabilities. The direction of the alternative for the one-sided
test is given by the economic intuition of individuals from the North having a more positive income mobility
than those from the South.
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using the panel.
Table 1.4 and confirm what we found in the previews analysis: individuals from the North faced
a significantly higher upward probability in the first of the three classes and a lower downward
probability in the top class.
1.4.2 Analysis considering age and education
In what follows, we extend the analysis including education as second covariate: we are going to
test if income mobility among individuals with similar age and education is the same in the North
and South of Italy. In the SHIW, education is a categorical covariate. We divide the sample
in two: individuals that just attended compulsory education studying 8 years 6, and those that
achieved high school diploma, bachelor degree and post graduate studies. After cleaning the
data to avoid inconsistent education between the two years, we find that in the North around
60% of the individual have higher education, while in the South around 52%.
The fact of splitting the sample in education classes forces us to bring the analysis from 3 classes
of income to 2 in order to have some power in testing. We run the above analysis on a 2 × 2
transition matrix, where the classes are defined by the median of the national active population.
6In 2007 compulsory education in Italy became 10 years; but this does not affect the sample
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In order to have comparable results, we run also the test considering just age as in the previews
analysis. The results of the test are presented in Table 1.5, while the transition probabilities, their
differences and the number of observations in each class are given in Table 1.6. Table 1.5 shows
that the extra covariate does not mitigate the differences between the income mobility of North
and South of Italy, which significantly persist also among individuals with similar education. In
fact, we reject the null hypothesis of equality of the transition probabilities in both education
subsamples.7 In the period, individuals from the North faced a statistically significant more
positive income mobility. The estimated conditional transition probability curves are given in
Figure A.2 in Appendix. The figure shows that the assumption of non-crossing curves is satisfied,
with the exception of the transition probability of individuals in the lower half of the income
distribution with just compulsory education.
These results are in line with those in Cappellari [2004]: in the parametric model he uses for
studying the transition probabilities to enter and exit the low wage class, the coefficients of the
dummy variables for education and for the different regions are all significant.
In conclusion, our analysis showed that individuals that lived and worked in the North of Italy
between 2004 and 2008 faced a more positive income dynamic than individuals living in the
South with similar age and education.
Table 1.5: Testing Transition Probabilities around the median accounting for age and education.
conditional on age
cl. 2004 cl. 2008 unconditional on ed. low ed. high ed.
1 1 0.338 0.970 0.003
1 2 0.338 0.970 0.003
2 1 0.003 0.005 0.087
2 2 0.003 0.005 0.087
The p-values of the tests are reported. The null is equality between North and South
transition probabilities. The direction of the alternative for the one-sided test is given
by the economic intuition of individuals from the North having a more positive income
mobility than those from the South.
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using
the panel.
1.5 Concluding remarks
We investigated if individuals from the South of Italy face a different short run income mobility
than individuals from the North. Using the data from the SHIW for the period 2004-2008 and
a new nonparametric testing procedure, we have shown that individuals from the South face a
worse income dynamic than those from the North with similar age and education.
7As mentioned in Section 1.2, we do not obtain a joint result for both education categories with our testing
procedure, we consider the results for each education subsample separately.
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Table 1.6: Conditional transition probabilities and classes size in the education analysis.
Unconditional on education
cl. 2004 cl. 2008 North South N-S Tot.cl1 N Tot.cl1 S
1 1 0.71 0.72 -0.01 510 421
1 2 0.29 0.28 0.01 510 421
2 1 0.24 0.31 -0.07 499 255
2 2 0.76 0.69 0.07 499 255
Compulsory education
cl. 2004 cl. 2008 North South N-S Tot.cl1 N Tot.cl1 S
1 1 0.81 0.77 0.04 254 240
1 2 0.19 0.23 -0.04 254 240
2 1 0.40 0.51 -0.11 152 80
2 2 0.60 0.49 0.11 152 80
High education
cl. 2004 cl. 2008 North South N-S Tot.cl1 N Tot.cl1 S
1 1 0.61 0.65 -0.04 255 181
1 2 0.39 0.35 0.04 255 181
2 1 0.17 0.21 -0.04 346 175
2 2 0.83 0.79 0.04 346 175
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using the
panel.
The nonparametric one-sided test we introduced was never used in the comparison of conditional
transition probabilities. The test is based on covariate matching techniques, do not assume any
functional form for the dependence of the transition probability on the covariate and allow
for different sample design. We analysed its small sample properties showing the test behaves
properly also with relatively small sample sizes.
Chapter 2
The effect of adverse labor market
entry conditions on wage mobility: a
transition matrix approach.
2.1 Introduction
Due to the economic crisis, the youth unemployment rate around Europe, and in particular in
the southern countries, exploded. There is an increasing concern on how the actual economic
conditions will affect the future career of young workers who are entering the labor market.
Among European countries, Italy is one of those with the highest youth unemployment rate,
which reached above 42% in January 2014, and the public debate on the urgency of making
reforms to help young workers entering the labor market is particularly strong.
We enter the debate studying the effect of high unemployment entry conditions on the wage
mobility of young males in Italy. Our focus is to determine if individuals who enter the labor
market in different economic phases have the same possibilities to improve their social condition;
where social condition means the class of the wage distribution they belong to. The analysis is
based on a transition matrix approach and a nonparametric testing methodology that was never
used before in the context of wage mobility. We use Italian administrative data and compare
wage mobility between young males (14-26 years old) who enter the labor market in a period of
high unemployment (1986-1988) and in a period of low unemployment (1990-1992). The analysis
is run on different time horizons: we consider the first four years of potential experience, the
first ten years and from the fourth year of potential experience to the tenth. We use 3-by-3
transition matrices and account for individuals’ demographic characteristics that could affect
wage mobility such as age at first spell, education, geographic area of the first spell and first
type of occupation. We show that individuals who entered the labor market between 1986 and
17
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1988 face a less favorable wage mobility compared to individuals that entered between 1990 and
1992 in the first ten years of potential experience. In particular, there is a clear disadvantage
in the probabilities of reaching the top class of the wage distribution. There is also evidence of
a rigid labor market in terms of job mobility. We argue that individuals who enter during the
high unemployment period remain ”trapped” in worse jobs and cannot reach those occupations
that would allow them to move to the top class of the wage distribution. The estimated average
loss of entering in the period 86-88 over the first ten years of potential experience is more than
17,600 euros. This amount is equivalent to around 79% of the median tenth year income of
individuals who entered in the period 1986-1988.
The effect of entering the labor market in adverse economic conditions on future labor outcomes
is topic of a growing literature.1 Labor outcomes such as the probability of being employed
after a certain period, actual experience, job mobility and full time worker status are studied in
the literature, but usually the main focus is on wages. Labor market entry conditions are often
summarized in terms of unemployment.2 Works such as Kahn [2010], Genda et al. [2010], Ore-
opoulos et al. [2012] among others, find a negative persistent effect of adverse market conditions
on future wages. This type of analysis is usually undertaken by means of parametric models
in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of wages and the parameters of interest are
the coefficients of the covariate that summarizes the entry conditions and its interactions with
other elements of interest (e.g. experience or measure of skills). These models allow to control
for several covariates and to determine causality, but they do not allow to capture how adverse
entry conditions affect the individuals wage dynamics in relation to the rest of the population
they live in. For example, with a parametric approach of the type we just described, we would
eventually find a significant negative effect of entering in period 86-88 on the future expected
wages. In our approach we can indicate that this negative effect is mainly concentrated in the
probabilities of reaching the top of the wage distribution and it is not constant among classes.
Our wage mobility approach gives a different and complementary set of insights to the previous
parametric approaches used in literature.
In order to compare the transition matrices between the two groups of individuals, we use a
nonparametric two-sided test to study the hypothesis of equal conditional transition probabilities
between two samples. A nonparametric test allows to not assume any functional form for
the transition probabilities and it is more appropriate than a parametric model such as the
probit from a theoretical point of view. Bhattacharya and Mazumder [2011] highlight that to
use a parametric model such as the probit in the context of transition probabilities would be
problematic because “..., it is unclear what type of joint distribution of errors will imply a probit
1See Oreopoulos et al. [2012] for an excellent review of the literature and of the possible explanations for the
persistence of the effect of entry labor market conditions.
2For example, Kahn [2010] divides college graduates in low, medium and high unemployment groups; Ore-
opoulos et al. [2012] define a recession as an increase of 5 percentage points in unemployment rate, Genda et al.
[2010] use unemployment rate.
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form for transition probabilities; in particular, a bivariate normal error distribution will not,..”.
Besides, they show that a probit leads to qualitative misleading conclusions in their empirical
analysis.
We are not aware of any previous work that tried to determine the effect of adverse entry
conditions for the Italian case. Several works study Italian wage mobility and the evolution of
young individuals careers from different perspectives. Among others, Cappellari [2007] studies
wage mobility in and out the low paid class of the Italian population, Bigard et al. [1998] use
a transition matrix approach to compare Italian and French earnings mobility, Del Bono and
Vuri [2011] use administrative data to investigate gender differences in job mobility and wages,
Contini and Grand [2010] study the effect of the first job length and wage on the individuals
survival rate in the labor market, Rosolia and Torrini [2007] study the evolution of age-earnings
profiles comparing different cohorts since the ’70s.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we describe in detail our analysis, in
section 3 we talk about the data we use, in section 4 and 5 we present the results of our analysis
and in section 6 we conclude.
2.2 Analysis description
We compare weekly wage mobility between individuals who entered the job market with age
14-26 in the periods 1986-1988 and 1990-1992. In between these two periods, young males un-
employment rate passed from 27.47% in 1987 to 22.62% in 1990, a 5 percentage points decrease.3
We consider individuals who entered the job market around the peak of 1987 and those who
entered in the successive years to 1990, when the unemployment stabilized around 23%. The
average young male unemployment rate of period 86-88 is 26.62%; the one of period 90-92 is
22.94%.4 Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of young males unemployment and starting real
average weekly wages between 1985 and 2004. The figure shows the negative relation between
unemployment rate and real starting wages and highlights how the initial wage of group 86-88
is lower than for group 90-92 (in the rest of the paper we use the term group to distinguish
between individuals who entered the job market in different periods, thus group 86-88 are those
individuals who entered in period 86-88).
We compare wage mobility in terms of potential experience: before we run the analysis on
a short run period of four years (periods 1989-1993 and 1993-97 for groups 86-88 and 90-92
respectively), successively we study a long run period with the first ten years (1989-1999 and
1993-2003 respectively), finally we consider a period that starts from the fifth year and goes up
to the tenth (1993-1999 and 1997-2003 respectively). Considering three periods allows us both to
3Unemployment rate data are from the Italian national statistics institute (Istat) and available at www.istat.it.
4We run the analysis on periods 87-89 and 91-93 as robustness check.
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment and first wage
Sources: Young males unemployment rate from ISTAT (www.istat.it), first
real weekly wages time series is Authors’ calculation. Base year: 2012.
see the persistence of the unemployment effect on wage mobility and to determine dynamically
when it arises. To start the analysis in year 1989 for group 86-88 and year 1993 for group
90-92 allows all individuals from each group to have at least one whole first year of potential
experience.
As it is set up, the analysis could be affected by a problem of self selection: for example, most
able individuals could decide to not enter the labor market and to continue to study during the
high unemployment period; or they could migrate abroad to look for better opportunities. If
this happens, the two groups differ in terms of unobservable ability and the comparison between
them, without taking this into account, will give biased results. We discuss this issue in details
when presenting the results and show that they are robust to self selection.
We study wage mobility by means of 3X3 transition matrices. Class boundaries are taken as the
quantiles corresponding to probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 of the national wage distribution and are
considered as exogenous.5
5For each year of analysis, the national wage distribution is estimated using all the individuals available from
the administrative data that we describe in section 4. For example, in the study of wage mobility for group 86-88
for period 1989-1993, we use all the individuals available in the data for year 1989 to estimate the national wage
distribution and the quantiles of that year; while we use all available individuals for year 1993 to estimate the
national wage distribution and the quantiles of that year. Each of our groups of analysis is around 8% of an annual
sample. Since the proportion is small, we consider class boundaries as exogenous. The relation between the total
sample size and the number of new male workers for each year can be seen in Table B.34 in the Complementary
Material.
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We compare the probability for each transition between the two groups. We focus our analysis on
the upward transition probabilities from class one of the wage distribution and on the transition
probabilities from class two (in the rest of the paper we define the first class as the lowest class
of wage mobility and the third class as the top class). This choice follows the fact that young
males are most likely to enter in the first class of the wage distribution when they start working,
eventually the second. Joining the two groups, we find that around 85% of individuals are in
the first or second class when they enter the job market.
The comparison of the transition probabilities between the two groups of individuals is done
by means of the conditional and unconditional tests. If the transition probability depends on a
covariate, we call it conditional and test it with a conditional nonparametric test in the spirit
of Cabus [1998], Neumeyer and Dette [2003] and Neumeyer [2004]. If the probability does not
depend on any covariate, we perform a standard unconditional t-test.
We define the conditional transition probability p(s)(C0, C1, x) = Pr[Y
(s)
1 ∈ C1|Y (s)0 ∈ C0, X(s) = x]
as the probability of the random variable Y (s), in group s, to pass from a determined state C0
in period zero to another state C1 in period one, given to be in state C0 in the first period and
the covariate X(s) = x. In our application, variable Y (s) is the weekly wage, states C0 and C1
are the classes of the wage distribution at the beginning and at the end of the period of analysis,
X(s) is a covariate of interest such as age at first spell.
We test the null hypothesis of equality of conditional transition probabilities on the common
support I of covariate X:
H0 : p
(1)(C0, C1, x) = p
(2)(C0, C1, x) for all x ∈ I; (2.1)
against the alternative H1 of the negation of the null.
The equivalent unconditional probability is p(s)(C0, C1) = Pr[Y
(s)
1 ∈ C1|Y (s)0 ∈ C0] and we test the
null hypothesis:
H0 : p
(1)(C0, C1)− p(2)(C0, C1) = 0, (2.2)
against the alternative:
H1 : p
(1)(C0, C1)− p(2)(C0, C1) 6= 0;
We perform the analysis on different subgroups. For example instead of comparing group 86-88
and group 90-92 we compare wage mobility between individuals from group 86-88 who started
to work in the North of Italy and with high education with similar individuals from group 90-92.
Which test is used and the subgroups considered will depend on the possibility to determine
the causal effect of entry conditions on wage mobility. We explain this in detail in the following
demographic analysis.
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2.3 The Data
We use the Italian administrative data (INPS) distributed by Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti.
The data concern non-agricultural private employees born the 10th of March, June, September,
and December of each year, and cover period 1985-2004. The original data contain from 150,000
to 190,000 records for each year. Every record corresponds to an employment spell and there
could be several per individual. We summarize the information in order to obtain one record
per person.
In the original data, for each spell, we can find information on the number of months, weeks,
days worked in the year, the end date, a string of zeros and ones showing in which months
the individual works, if the spell is part-time, the sum of gross monthly wages, the eventual
lump-sum wages, eventual special wages6 and the geographic area where the spell takes place.
Also demographic information on individuals such as sex and year of birth is available. Since we
do not have information on education, we assign low education to individuals who entered the
job market less than 19 years old and high education to those that entered at 19 or more. Thus,
category high education includes both secondary and tertiary education.This is a common choice
when dealing with Italian administrative data (e.g. Del Bono and Vuri [2011] consider the same
definition of education and show that it is a reasonable one using the Survey on Households
Income and Wealth database by Bank of Italy).7
We summarize the original data and for each individual compute the number of weeks worked
per year (using the number of weeks used for determining the contribution period for old age
benefits for part time workers), the year total wage as sum of the gross wages and lump-sum
wages, the year weekly gross wage, the main occupation of the individual in that year, the area
of the main occupation. Further, we obtain the year of individuals’ first spell, the individual
first occupation and working area and the age at the first spell.
The first spell is defined as the first non-seasonal spell that lasts at least 13 weeks (we consider
a spell to be seasonal if it lasts less than 17 weeks and ends in September or October).8 The
main spell of the year is the one that lasted the most full time weeks in the year. In case of two
spells with the same length, we choose the last spell had and eventually we prefer a full-time
6Special wages refer to specific type of workers. They are defined by law.
7We expect individuals with tertiary education to be a small proportion of the sample. From the World
Development Indicators database by the World Bank it can be seen that the gross male enrollment rate in
tertiary education in period 1980-1991 reached a maximum of 32% (see Figure B.2 in the Appendix). Besides, in
Del Bono and Vuri [2011] they find, using the SHIW, that the proportion of individuals that entered the labor
market with tertiary education in period 1989-1998, with age 15-25, is less than 3%.
8The nature of the data does not allow to be certain about the identification of the first spell. We can observe
the first spell in the non-agricultural private sector, but there is the possibility that some worker had previous
job spells in the public and agricultural sectors before, and the probability of this happening increases with age
at first spell. We take this into account running a robustness check and showing that this does not seem to be a
problem in our analysis.
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over a part-time spell. Those individuals for whom it was not possible to determine a unique
main spell are removed from the sample (around 700 individuals out of more than 100000).
Finally, we trim top and bottom 1% of the weekly wage distribution, exclude negative wages
or wages equal to zero, remove individuals with special wages ( around 3,000 individuals out of
more than 100,000).
The final panels for the short run analysis include 4,744 and 4,426 individuals for groups 86-88
and 90-92 respectively, while for the long run they include 3,992 and 4,087 individuals respec-
tively. The panels for the analysis on the second six years of potential experience have 4,155
and 3,864 for groups 86-88 and 90-92 respectively9. The higher attrition in group 86-88 could
be a consequence of the less favorable entry conditions: if the unemployment has a negative
persistent effect on individuals’ career in terms of job stability, and the cost of searching for a
job increases over time, there will be a higher proportion of individuals exiting the labor market
among those who entered in the high unemployment period. We consider attrition when we
interpret the results of our analysis.
2.4 Demographic analysis
Wage mobility of young workers may be affected by their demographic characteristics at the
beginning of the working career, and we need to consider them in the analysis to give a causal
interpretation to the effect of unemployment on wage mobility. For example, if the low unem-
ployment group has a higher proportion of individuals with high education and a better wage
mobility than the high unemployment group, it is not possible to determine if the better wage
mobility is caused by the labor market entry conditions or by the different distribution of ed-
ucation. To solve the problem, we need to compare wage mobility between the subgroup of
individuals with high/low education from the high unemployment group and the correspondent
subgroup from the low unemployment group, for both categories. On the other hand, if the two
groups are similar in terms of demographic characteristics, and we assume that their effect on
wage mobility is the same in the two groups, we do not need to take them into account in the
comparison. For instance, if the probability distribution of education is the same in the two
groups, then education is not going to be the cause of the different wage mobility.
With discrete covariates, we test the null hypothesis of the equality of the probability distri-
butions between two samples by means of the Pearson’s χ2 test of independence. The null
9We consider all individuals that start to work in periods 86-88 and 90-92 respectively and are present in the
panel after four and ten years of career. We obtain a slightly different panel than the one for the ten year analysis.
The objective is to have the maximum number of observations.
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hypothesis is the independence between the covariate of interest and a binary variable that rep-
resent the group the individuals belong to. With continuous covariates we use the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
We investigate if education, first type of occupation, first area of work and age at first spell have
the same probability distribution in the two groups, 86-88 and 90-92, using the panels from the
four years analysis. If this happens for some of the covariates, we ignore it when comparing wage
transition probabilities. If the probability distribution differs, we need to take it into account. If
the covariate is categorical, we split the group into the covariate categories creating subgroups
and compare the transition probabilities between each subgroup. If it is continuous, we account
for it using our conditional test.
The demographic analysis shows that we need to consider first area of work, education and age at
first spell to determine causality. The subgroups on which we run the analysis on wage mobility
are: individuals from overall Italy with low education, from the South with high education, from
the Center with high education and from the North with high education.
Table 2.1: Comparison of the proportion of the different types of first occupation, education, first area of work in the two
groups, and sample sizes.
Italy whole North high Center high South high Italy low
86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92
Apprentices 0.36 0.32 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.85 0.86
Blue collars 0.47 0.47 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.77 0.70 0.14 0.14
Man. & White col. 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.18 0.25 0.01 0.00
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
North 0.55 0.64 0.65 0.68
Center 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.17
South 0.28 0.17 0.19 0.15
Low educ. 0.38 0.33
High educ. 0.62 0.67
Obs. 4743 4426 1436 1852 526 577 962 554 1819 1443
In Table 2.1 we present the probability distribution of the demographic characteristics in the
whole groups and in the four subgroups we consider in our analysis. In column “Italy whole”
the proportion of “managers and white collar” is 5 percentage points higher in group 90-92 than
in group 86-88 while the proportion of “blue collar” is 5 points lower. Besides, the proportion
of individuals from the North of Italy in group 90-92 is 9 points higher than in group 86-88
while the proportion from the South is 11 points lower. Finally, the percentage of high educated
workers is 5 points higher. Nevertheless, the demographic differences between the two groups
tend to disappear in the subgroups.
We run the Pearson’s χ2 test of independence for first type of occupation, education and first
area of work and run the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for age at entry. We run the tests on
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different subgroups and for the three initial income classes.10 Since ”Apprentices” is rather a
temporary working condition than a type of occupation, we test independence in three different
ways: at first we consider ”Apprentices” as a different type of occupation; then we remove
from the sample those individuals with ”Apprentices” as first occupation; finally we attribute to
these individuals the second occupation they held.11 We investigate independence in all three
cases. In Table 2.2 we report the p-values of the tests; the null hypothesis is the equality of
the covariate’ s probability distribution in the two subgroups. More details on the covariates’
frequency distribution for each subgroup we use in the analysis and test statistics can be found
in the Complementary Material of the paper.
In Table 2.2, column of Italy, low education, the null hypothesis is never rejected at 5% for
any demographic covariate (the χ2 p-value of class 2 for first area of work is border line). We
do not need to take into account neither age nor education nor area of work to determine the
causality of unemployment in this subgroup. To run the unconditional test is adequate. In
column Center, high education, type of occupation is equally distributed in the two subgroups
while the p-value of age is border line for class 2 and 3. We run our conditional test on age
in order to get causality. In column South, high education, we reject the null hypothesis for
occupation at 5% in class 2. We run a χ2 test on occupation dividing the samples in age classes
and we see in Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix that once we account for age, we overall do
not reject the null hypothesis.12 Running our conditional test on age we can limit the effect of
this change in the occupation distribution in the two periods. A similar reasoning can be done
on the occupation distribution of subgroup North, high education, although the rejection of the
null hypothesis at 5% is not clear in this case. Tables B.3 and B.4 in the Appendix show the
results of the test on occupation when age is considered. In this case, the use of our test is also
required by the rejection of the null of equality of the age distribution in the two groups.
We argue that using the right testing methodology we are able to obtain results on the ef-
fect of unemployment on wage mobility that are not significantly affected by the demographic
characteristics we considered.
10To determine the effect of the entry conditions on the transition probability from class 1 to 2, we need
individuals in class 1 at the beginning of the period to be similar between the two groups in terms of demographic
characteristics.
11We compute the second occupation following the same criteria we used for the first.
12 Considering age classes reduces the sample size on which the test is run and thus its power. We cannot
determine to what extent the lack of rejection of the null is due to a correlation between occupation and age or
to a lack of power of the test.
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2.5 Comparison of wage mobility and other labor market out-
comes
Figure 2.2 compares the evolution of the real mean weekly wages and of the probabilities of
being in the three income classes over the potential experience for the two groups of analysis.
We can see that the mean real weekly wage of group 90-92 is higher at the beginning of the
working career (346 euros group 86-88, 369 group 90-92) and continues to be higher in the long
run. Individuals who enter in the high unemployment period seem to have an initial lower
weekly wage and they cannot close the gap with group 90-92 in the first 10 years of potential
experience.13 From the second sub-figure we can see that the probabilities of being in the three
classes of the wage distribution evolve similarly at the beginning of the working careers, but
successively the differences between the two groups widen: group 90-92 have higher probability
of being in class 3, group 86-88 have higher probability of being in class 2, the probability of
being in class 1 keeps being higher for group 86-88. The social condition of individuals entered
in period 86-88 seems to worsen compared to those entered in period 90-92.
Figure 2.2: Evolution of the real mean weekly wages and of the probabilities of being in the three income classes over the
potential experience.
Sources: Authors’ calculation.
We summarize the results of our comparison of wage mobility in Table 2.3. We focus on the
upward probabilities from class 1 and on the up and downward probabilities from class 2.14 The
subgroups considered are North, Center, South with high education and the whole Italy with
low education.
13The crossing between the two lines from the second to the fourth year of potential experience could be due
to the different economic conditions in periods 91-93 and 95-97, with the first being of lower unemployment and
higher wages. This would imply that the economic conditions in the years successive to the beginning of the
career have an effect on wage mobility. We will consider this in details when discussing the results.
14The complete transition matrices for the two groups, their differences, the unconditional and conditional tests’
p-values can be found the Complementary Material of the paper.
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Table 2.3 contains the differences between the transition probabilities of individuals who entered
the labor market during the high unemployment period (86-88) minus those of individuals who
entered in the low unemployment period (90-92). For each difference, we report the p-value from
our conditional test considering age for the high education subgroups and from the unconditional
test for the low education one. The null hypothesis of the tests is the equality of the transition
probabilities between the two groups of individuals 86-88 and 90-92. The conditional test results
are robust to bandwidth selection.15
We find that individuals that entered in period 86-88 (high unemployment) have a worse long
run wage mobility than individuals that entered in period 90-92. The difference seems to arise
after the first four years of potential experience and it is particularly clear for the transition
probabilities of reaching the top class of the wage distribution. A better wage mobility for group
90-92 implies that the starting weekly wage disadvantage of group 86-88 caused by entering the
job market during the high unemployment period tends to increase over time, mainly in the
long run. These findings are in line with the theory that during a high unemployment period
individuals find worse jobs than those that would be the right match with their skills. This
initial mismatch delays the creation of specialized human capital and increases the time the
individuals take to find a better job.
In Table 2.3, 21 out of 36 upward probabilities (probabilities of improving the individual’s social
position passing to a higher class of wage) present a negative difference: they are higher for
group 90-92 than for group 86-88. Out of 21, 16 are statistically different from zero. Overall the
table, 8 upward probabilities have a positive difference, with 3 significant. For what concerns
the downward probabilities, 9 out of 12 have a positive sign in the difference and 8 out of 9 are
significant. These results depict a situation in which individuals from period 86-88 have lower
probabilities to improve their wage position and higher probabilities to worsen it.
The results in the short run subtable do not offer a clear image of the difference between the
two groups’ wage mobility. There is not a clear path in the signs nor in the significance level
of the differences. The disadvantage of group 86-88 becomes evident in the subtables of the
long run and successive years analyses. In the long run subtable, 9 out of 12 upward transition
probabilities have a negative difference and 7 out of 9 are statistically significant. All 4 down-
wards probabilities have a positive difference and 3 are statistically significant. Similar results
are found in the successive years analysis subtable. These findings indicate that there is a signif-
icant difference in the long run wage mobility between the two groups and that the differences
15We multiply the bandwidths by a weight from 1 to 6. With weight from 1 to 4 the results we obtain are
almost identical, with weights 5 and 6 we overall reject less, but the results do not change qualitatively.
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mainly arise after the first four years of potential experience.16 The results are overall similar
in the four subgroups, indicating a lack of strong regional effects.
Finally, we can see a clear difference in the long run probabilities to reach the top class of the
wage distribution in the two groups: 7 out of 8 long run upward transition probabilities to
the third class are higher for group 90-92 and are all significant. If we observe the magnitude
of the differences, we see that those from class 2 to 3 of the long run table have the highest
(above 8 percentage points). This suggests that the biggest difference between the two groups’
wage mobility lays in the probabilities of reaching the top class of the wage distribution and in
particular to pass from class 2 to 3.
In the data description we pointed out that there is some attrition in our panels, with group 86-88
that looses more observations than group 90-92 between the four and ten years analyses. If those
individuals who exit the job market because of the higher unemployment entry condition are
the less skilled, then our results are strengthen by the attrition: 86-88 is a more selective group
of individuals and still they have a worse wage mobility than group 90-92. Another possible
explanation for the attrition could be an higher migration abroad of individuals that entered
during the higher unemployment period. If the individuals who migrate are the most skilled,
then our results could overestimate the effect of the labor market entry conditions. However,
from the International Migration Database by OECD it can be seen that the number of Italian
individuals who migrate from Italy in period 1994-1999 is similar to the number that migrate in
period 1998-2003.17 This excludes a significant effect of migration on our results.
Also the timing of the two periods, high unemployment before low unemployment, strengthens
our results. If those individuals who find an occupation in the high unemployment period are
the most skilled, there could be a number of low skilled workers entering the sample of group
90-92 because they remained unemployed before (they could even pass age 19 and figure in the
high education class although they are not). This flow of low skilled workers would lead to
underestimate the positive effect of entering in the low unemployment period. Still we find a
positive significant effect. On the other side, if the most able individuals decide to continue
to study during the high unemployment period, waiting for better opportunities, and enter the
labor market during the low unemployment period, then we would overestimate the effect of the
entry conditions on wage mobility. Nevertheless, Figure B.2 in the Appendix does not show any
discontinuity in the trend of secondary and tertiary school enrollment rate for males during the
high unemployment period. Thus we exclude that this type of self selection affects our results.
16The lack of a significantly different wage mobility between the two groups in the first four years of experience
could be partially explained by the better economic conditions in period 1989-1993 compared to period 1993-1997.
The initial disadvantage of the high unemployment group could be partially compensated by the more positive
economic situation during the first years of career. We discuss the consequences of analyzing wage mobility on
two different periods shortly.
17From the International Migration Database by OECD we estimated that the total number of Italians who
migrated abroad in period 1994-1999 is 368,202 while those who migrated in period 1998-2003 are 339,411. The
difference is 28,791 over the whole Italian population.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of wage mobility.
(a) Short run: periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob. diff 0.014 -0.024 0.034** -0.036**
p-value 0.170 0.120 0.045 0.048
class 1 to 3 Prob. diff 0.002 0.002* -0.000 0.000
p-value 0.290 0.080 0.185 0.955
class 2 to 1 Prob. diff 0.029* -0.004* 0.044** 0.003
p-value 0.000 0.095 0.005 0.951
class 2 to 3 Prob. diff -0.031** 0.114** -0.001 0.009
p-value 0.005 0.000 0.225 0.812
(b) Long run: periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob. diff -0.035 0.079** -0.014 0.050**
p-value 0.285 0.025 0.285 0.014
class 1 to 3 Prob. diff -0.037** -0.114** -0.034** -0.037**
p-value 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.026
class 2 to 1 Prob. diff 0.029** 0.085** 0.053** 0.027
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.396
class 2 to 3 Prob. diff -0.081** -0.094** 0.010 -0.086*
p-value 0.000 0.005 0.210 0.099
(c) Successive years: periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob. diff -0.068** 0.057** -0.008 0.066**
p-value 0.000 0.020 0.190 0.017
class 1 to 3 Prob. diff -0.016 -0.078** -0.016* -0.031*
p-value 0.135 0.010 0.085 0.099
class 2 to 1 Prob. diff 0.026** 0.051** 0.078** 0.002
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.929
class 2 to 3 Prob. diff -0.046** -0.088** -0.051** -0.054**
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
The groups of analysis are composed by individuals entering the labor market in three consecutive
years: e.g. 1986, 1987, 1988 for the high unemployment group. This implies that the potential
experience of the individuals in the year we start the analysis (e.g. 1989) ranges between 1
and 3. A different distribution of the potential experience at start could affect the results of
the analysis on the first four years of career. We report in Table B.5 in the Appendix the
distribution of experience at start in the two groups for the subgroups of analysis. Although
there are some differences, they are not large. We run the same type of testing than in the
demographic analysis above to check the equality in probability distribution of the potential
experience at start. Table B.6 in the Appendix shows that we do not reject the null hypothesis
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of independence at 1% significance level in all subgroups except for the North, high education.
This result should be considered when interpreting the results of the analysis on the first four
years of career of the latter subgroup. Intuitively, small differences in the potential experience
at start, although significant, should not affect the results of the analysis on the first ten years
of career ( i.e. to have 12 or 10 years of potential experience should not make a significant
difference in terms of wage mobility). This intuition is confirmed by the robustness check run on
individuals who entered the labor market in periods 1987-1988 and 1991-1992 that we present
next subsection.
Comparing wage mobility between the two groups in terms of potential experience leads to
compare different periods with a shift of four years between them. For example, when we
compare wage mobility of period 1989-1999 for group 86-88 with that of period 1993-2003 for
group 90-92, the two periods of analysis overlap from 1993 to 1999 and do not overlap from 1989
to 1992 and from 2000 to 2003. It could be argued that our results are affected by the different
economic conditions the two groups face in these non-overlapping intervals; in particular that
group 90-92 enjoys a better wage mobility in the long run because it faces a low unemployment
period in years 2001-2003. However, looking at the two non-overlapping periods 1989-1992 and
2000-2003 in Figure 2.1, we see that both periods are characterized by low unemployment with
the difference that the first is at the beginning of group 86-88 working career while the second
is after 8 years of potential experience for group 90-92. Although the drop in young males
unemployment is larger in 2001-2003, we assert that its positive effect on the wage mobility of
group 90-92 is not more relevant than the one of period 1990-1992 on the wage mobility of group
86-88 because of the different timing. It has been shown in literature that economic conditions
affect more new workers than experienced workers: e.g. Oreopoulos et al. [2012] show that the
effect of regional unemployment on wages is not significant for individuals with five or more years
of experience. In conclusion, our results should not be significantly affected by the difference in
the economic conditions of the periods of analysis.
Finally we argue that the abolition of the wage index mechanism (’scala mobile’) in 1992 does not
affect our results. Manacorda [2004] argues that ’scala mobile’ actuated as an equalizing factor
in the Italian earnings distribution until the beginning of the ’80s, but then this effect faded
away. Although the dispersion of the earnings distribution could theoretically affect transition
probabilities, our periods of analysis do not belong to the period affected by ’scala mobile’.
Besides, we do not notice any effect on the level of entry wages nor on the average cumulative
income of the first four years.
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2.5.1 Robustness Checks
We summarize in here the main robustness checks outcomes, while we report all the details in
Section B.5 of the Appendix.
The results are robust to a different definition of first spell. In our analysis, an individual enters
the labor market with a first spell of at least 13 weeks outside periods characterized by seasonal
work. If we reduce the number of weeks to 4 the results both of the demographic and wage
mobility analyses do not change.
To control if the results are driven by the selection of the groups, we delay the analysis of one
year considering the individuals who enter the labor market between 1987 and 1989 as high
unemployment group and those who enter between 1991 and 1993 as low unemployment group.
The results are overall robust to the change. Group 91-93 faces a more positive wage mobility.
It seems the differences between the two groups is clear since the beginning of the career, while
in the original analysis it is not. This difference could be due to the fact that when individuals
enter in 91-93 the low unemployment period has already started since one year and their initial
entry conditions are even more positive than for group 90-92 (figure 2.2 shows they have higher
wages). The results on the difference in the upward probabilities of reaching the top class of the
wage distribution are confirmed.
We study mobility using 5X5 transition matrices to verify if the results are robust to the def-
inition and the number of classes. The analysis confirms our conclusions in terms of the sign
and the magnitude in the differences between the transition probabilities, for all periods. As
expected, passing from three to five classes decreases the number of observations available in
each transition, reducing the power of the tests. For this reason we reject overall less the null
hypothesis of equality of transition probabilities.
In the original analysis we include individuals up to 26 years old. We now restrict the sample
to individuals up to 22 years old. With such as restriction we limit the possibility of including
in the sample workers who became non-agricultural private employees from another type of
occupation.18 The restriction on the age reduces considerably the sample size and lowers the
power of our tests; however the analysis does not contradict our results (the signs are as expected
but overall we reject less the null hypothesis of equality) and confirms the findings on the upward
probabilities of reaching the top class of the wage distribution.
To see if the results differ when more homogeneous groups are considered, both in terms of de-
mographic characteristics and potential experience at start, we select as higher unemployment
group those individuals that enter the labor market in period 1987-1988 and as lower unemploy-
ment group those that enter in period 1991-1992. In the new groups, the lack of rejection of
18We also exclude individuals with a college degree.
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the null of equality in probability distribution is stronger than in the original analysis, for all
the discrete demographic characteristics and for all subgroups. Also the difference in potential
experience at start is removed. The results of the analysis on wage mobility are similar to those
of the original in terms of the signs and the magnitudes of the differences between transition
probabilities, in any period considered. As expected, since we loose around one third of the
panels, the power of the tests reduces and we reject overall less the null hypothesis of equality of
transition probabilities. In conclusion, the original results are not affected by the eventual het-
erogeneity that we introduce by gathering in one group individuals who enter the labor market
in three successive years; instead, considering the larger groups increases significantly the power
of the tests.
We study wage mobility on the common period 2000-2004 to support the argument that the
results of the original analysis are not affected by the fact that we compare wage mobility on
different time intervals. In this comparison, group 86-88 have four years of potential experience
more than group 90-92. We choose period 2000-2004, the last four-year interval available, in
order to reduce the effect of the difference in potential experience on wage mobility (11 years
for group 86-88, 7 for group 90-92), that we expect to be decreasing over time. We find that
group 90-92 still enjoys a more positive wage mobility in the period. In particular the results
on the transition probabilities from the second class confirm those of the original analysis.
Thus, even considering a common period we find evidence of a better wage mobility for the low
unemployment group. Besides, this outcome importantly strengthens the finding of a persistent
negative effect of adverse entry conditions.
To show that our results are not driven by the low unemployment phase between 2001 and 2003,
we study wage mobility on the first 7 years of potential experience: on periods 1989-1996 and
1993-2000 for groups 86-88 and 90-92 respectively. The results of the original long run analysis
are confirmed.
Although it would be useful, we cannot run an analysis similar to the original in which we
compare the low unemployment period 1990-1992 with another successive high unemployment
period. The next and only high unemployment period available in our database is 1994-1997.
This period is characterized by an average increase of unemployment of just 3% does not allow
us to analyze the 10 years wage mobility because the panel stops in 2004, and individuals that
enter this period face a reform in 1997 with the aim of increasing the labor market flexibility
(Treu, Law 197/1997). These differences make hard to compare an analysis that includes this
period with the original.
We run anyway a robustness check studying groups 91-93 as low unemployment and 95-97 as
high unemployment. The objective is to find some evidence in support of the causality of entry
conditions on wage mobility. We exploit the regional variations in unemployment rate and choose
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the groups in such as way there is an increase of around 4% in the subgroup South.19 We find
that in subgroup South, high education, there is a better six years wage mobility for group 91-
03. Besides, we find that for subgroup North high education, where the unemployment remains
stable between the two groups, there is a similar wage mobility. Comparing these results with
the analysis on groups 87-89 and 91-93, we state that there is some evidence in support of the
causality of the entry conditions.
2.5.2 Other labor market outcomes
We extend our analysis to other labor market outcomes that could be affected by the unemploy-
ment entry conditions. For the two groups considered in the wage mobility analysis for the short
and long run periods respectively, we report in Table 2.4 descriptive statistics on individuals’
number of spells, actual individuals’ experience, cumulative income and weekly wage volatility.
From the table we can see that the average number of spells held by the individuals is similar in
the two different groups: around 2.5 in the short run and 4 in the long run. The average actual
experience is around 3.5 years in the short run and 8 years in the long run in both groups. These
two results together also suggest that the average spell length is similar between the two groups.
The median individual from group 90-92 earns around 4,000 euros more in the first four years of
career and more than 17,600 in the first 10 years. We estimate from our sample that the annual
median real income for an individual of group 86-88 after ten years of potential experience (in
year 1999) is around 22,300 euros. The loss in cumulated income for the median individual of
group 86-88 is equivalent to around 79% of the yearly income at the tenth years of potential
experience. Finally the average weekly wage standard deviation seems similar between the two
groups and quite small compared to the average mean weekly wages (e.g. less than one third).
Unemployment at entry does not seem to affect job mobility, while it would be reasonable to
expect group 86-88 to have a higher average number of job spells, indicating individuals’ attempt
to improve their working condition by searching for better jobs. This outcome could suggest that
the Italian job market is too rigid and does not allow individuals to change job at an affordable
cost. Another signal of the rigidity of the job market is that in our sample the median individual
changes job only twice during the first four years and 3 times in the first ten (in Topel and Ward
[1992] the median number of job spells for young American males in the first ten years of career
is 7).
The lack of flexibility of the labor market could explain the persistence of the entry conditions
effect. If the first jobs held determine future wage growth and mobility, a reduction of works
19The evolution of the young male unemployment rate in the three areas is presented in Figure B.1 in the
Appendix.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of other labor market outcomes.
Short run Long run
Number of spells 86 88 avg 2.5 4.1
avg se 0.0 0.1
med 2.0 3.0
med se 0.0 0.0
sd 1.5 3.8
90 92 avg 2.4 4.1
avg se 0.0 0.0
med 2.0 3.0
med se 0.0 0.2
sd 1.4 2.5
Actual experience 86 88 avg 38.9 94.0
avg se 0.2 0.5
med 45.0 107.0
med se 0.4 0.6
sd 11.7 29.6
90 92 avg 39.6 95.4
avg se 0.2 0.5
med 47.0 108.0
med se 0.2 0.1
sd 11.8 29.2
Cumulative Income 86 88 avg 78201.3 230598.4
avg se 547.6 1843.0
med 74266.1 213487.4
med se 531.4 1864.5
sd 33553.7 83505.6
90 92 avg 80907.4 244580.9
avg se 536.2 1786.7
med 78527.6 231163.3
med se 596.2 1699.6
sd 32064.7 84146.1
Wage volatility 86 88 avg avg 412.9 441.0
avg se 80.2 123.0
90 92 avg avg 417.3 458.6
avg se 74.6 127.2
Number of spells is in units, the actual experience is in months, cumulative income is in euros,
weekly wage volatility is in euro. The standard deviation of the median is obtained bootstrapping.
with good wage prospective during the high unemployment period will have a persistent effect
on new workers.
2.6 Concluding remarks
We investigated the effect of adverse entry conditions on young males’ wage mobility in Italy.
We compared the wage mobility of two groups of individuals who entered the labor market in
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a higher (86-88) and in a lower unemployment period (90-92). We showed that individuals who
entered in period 86-88 face a worse long run wage mobility, in particular they have significant
lower probabilities of reaching the top class of the wage distribution. We attribute the cause of
the persistence of the negative effect of high unemployment at entry to the rigidity of Italian
labor market where individuals struggle to improve their working status by changing job.
Our analysis could be used for policy evaluation purposes. In 1997 a labor market reform (Treu,
Law 197/1997) took place in Italy with the objective to increase the flexibility of the labor
market “mainly introducing temporary contracts and providing incentives for part-time job”
(Schindler [2009]). This was the most important reform of the Italian labor market in the last
two decades.20 With our analysis, and when data will be available, we could study if the Treu’s
reform removed the persistence of the effect of adverse entry conditions on young males’ wage
mobility. In fact, we could run the same analysis we undertook between individuals that entered
the labor market in periods 1998-1999 and 2001-2003 and compare the results to those obtained
in this paper.
20Another reform was introduced in 2003 (Legge Biagi, law 30/2003); however Barbieri and Scherer [2009] claim
that this reform “left the situation of the Italian labour market de facto unaltered”.
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Internal migration and wage growth
in Italy.
3.1 Introduction
Italy is a country characterized by a strong internal migration, where for internal migration we
mean moving among the three macro areas North, South and Centre. According to ISTAT1
more than three millions individuals moved among Italian regions between 1995 and 2004. From
an economic point of view, an individual migrates if he has an expected utility gain. This gain
can be given by an increase in the wage or by an increase in the likelihood of finding a job.
In this paper we focus on the effect of migrating on the salary of young males using Italian
administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS).
In the literature the effect of internal migration on wages has been recently studied, among
others, by Bo¨heim and Taylor [2007] for Britain, Ham et al. [2011], Yankow [2003] for US,
De´tang-Dessendre et al. [2004] for France. The findings differ: Ham et al. [2011] find a positive
contemporaneous effect on wages for college graduates and a negative effect for high school
dropouts, Bo¨heim and Taylor [2007] find a positive premium, Yankow [2003] finds a positive
immediate return for individuals without college education and a delayed positive effect for
college graduated, De´tang-Dessendre et al. [2004] do not find any significant effect of migration.
In our analysis on the effect of migration on individuals’ wage we focus on young males who have
high school as the highest level of education. We run two types of analysis. First we study the
effect of migrating on wage growth of the first eleven years of career, then we study the returns
to migration on the wages of the following five years. Our analysis follows the steps of Bo¨heim
and Taylor [2007], however it differentiates in two aspects: in their analysis they use a first
1http://demo.istat.it/altridati/trasferimenti/index e.html
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difference approach to estimate the immediate effect of migration while we use the differenced
approach to study the effect on the wage growth in the first eleven years of career; we use a
dynamic fixed effect model to study the returns to migration on the wages of the years following
migration while they use a static fixed effect model. To our knowledge this is the first work that
studies the effect of internal migration on Italian wages.
We find a positive effect on wage growth in the first eleven years of career if the migration spell
takes place in the first five years of experience and has the North as destination. On the other
hand, we find a negative immediate effect of migration when it has South as destination.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we describe the data used, in section
3 we present the analysis and the results, in section 4 we conclude.
3.2 The Data
We use the Italian administrative data (INPS) distributed by Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti.
The data concern non-agricultural private employees born the 10th of March, June, September,
and December of each year, and cover period 1985-2004. The original data contain from 150,000
to 190,000 records per year, where every record corresponds to an employment spell. Since
individuals could have more than one record per year, we summarize the information in order
to obtain one observation per person per year.
In the data the following information on job spells is available: the number of months, weeks,
days worked in the year, a string of zeros and ones showing in which months the individual
worked, if the spell is part-time, the sum of gross monthly wages and the geographic area where
the spell takes place. We have also demographic information on individuals such as sex, province
and year of birth. Information on firms such as sector and number of employees is limited to
period 1997-2002. We are able to assign firm sectors to job spells preceding 1997 and following
2002 assuming firms do not change sector and at the cost of losing several observations.
There is not information about the education of individuals in the data. Since we assume
education does not change for the individuals in the sample and use individual fixed effect
techniques in the analysis, this is not a concern.
Only young males who entered the labour market after 1985 at age 14-22 and for whom we
observe the 11th year of experience are included in the sample. We consider as new workers
those who do not appear in year 1985 and have their first job spell successively. The first spell
is the first non-seasonal occupation that lasts more than 12 weeks (we consider a spell to be
seasonal if it lasts less than 17 weeks and ends in September or October).
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Yearly weekly wages are obtained dividing the total yearly income by the total number of
weeks worked (for part time workers we use the number of weeks used for determining the
contribution period for old age benefits). For each year and for each individual, we select the
most representative spell in terms of weeks worked, spell type (full-time preferred over part-time)
and timing (later spells preferred). We call it main spell of the year. Spells that last less than
13 weeks are not considered when determining the number of spells held by the individuals and
job changing.
When studying the effect of migration on wages of the five following years, we assume migration
and job change to happen at the end of the year and attribute to the year in which they take
place the same weekly wage of the previous.2 This attribution is not unrealistic and allows to
fully capture the returns on wages of changing job and migrating.
We estimate inter-year spell duration, tenure and actual experience, exclude from the sample
those individuals for whom it was not possible to determine a unique main spell per year, trim
top and bottom 1% of the weekly wage distribution, exclude negative wages or wages equal to
zero and remove individuals with special wages.
The final sample is an unbalanced panel composed by 8965 males who enter the labor market
at age 14-22 and with 11 to 18 years of maximum experience at 2004.
3.3 The Analysis
We investigate the effect of internal migration on the wages of Italian young males at the begin-
ning of their career. In particular we study the effect of moving across the areas North, South
and Center of Italy. We consider individuals who entered the labor market between age 14 and
22. This selection should exclude individuals with college education from the sample: the usual
minimum age at which individuals obtained a degree in Italy in the analyzed period was 23.
Table 3.1 presents the distributions of first migration and job changing on potential experience
in our panel. Out of 8965 individuals, 881 migrates. There is not a clear trend of migration in
experience and around half of the migrations have the North as destination. On the other hand,
a large number of individuals change job at least once in the first 11 years of career. Also for
what concerns job changing there is not a clear trend in experience.
2The weekly wage is an average of the wages obtained overall the year. If migration and/or job change happen
during the year, then the weekly wage is the average of the two jobs held by the individual and the effect of
migration and/or job change on salaries would result smoothed out. This problem could be solved by considering
the single spells as unit of time and not the years. We leave this as possible extension of the analysis.
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Table 3.1: Job changes and migration.
exp1-11 exp1 exp2 exp3 exp4 exp5 exp6 exp7 exp8 exp9 exp10 exp11
Change job 8590 2011 2505 2774 2700 2604 2285 2059 1911 2014 2112 2386
First migration 881 98 78 76 81 91 78 85 71 66 67 90
First migr. to N. 469 38 36 48 48 54 39 46 38 36 38 48
First migr. to C. 222 35 17 9 15 22 24 19 21 18 16 26
First migr. to S. 186 25 24 19 18 15 15 19 10 12 13 16
The table indicates how many individuals of the sample changed job and/or migrated for each year of experience.
The total number of individuals is 8965.
We run two type of analyses: first we study the effect of migrating on individuals’ wage growth
in the first 11 years of career, then we analyse the returns to migration on the wages of the years
following migration. We implement the first analysis by means of a model in difference while we
use a dynamic fixed effect model for the second analysis.
3.3.1 The effect on wage growth in the first 11 years of career
To study the effect of migration on wage growth in the first 11 years of career the following
log-linear wage equation is considered:
wilt = Xiltβ +Altα+ φl + υi + γt + ilt (3.1)
where wilt is the logarithm of the real weekly wage of person i, at time t, in location l, Xilt
are individual/job characteristics that change over time and among areas, Alt are area specific
characteristics that change over time, φl and υi are time invariant location and individuals’
characteristics respectively, γt are time varying factors common to all individuals.
In Xilt we include the number of job spells held at time t, the number of times the worker
changed working area, the square of the age, actual experience held and its square, tenure in the
current job and its square, a dummy indicating if the main occupation held by the individual
at time t is part-time, dummies for the main occupation at t and its sector. Alt is a set of
interactions between year dummy variables and areas dummy variables.
We take the difference between the wage at the eleventh year of career and the wage at the first.
As first year of experience we consider the first whole year in the labor market.
The model in differences is:
∆10wil11 = θ1JobChange+θ2JobChange×Migration+∆10Xil11β+∆10Al11α+∆10γ11+∆10il11 (3.2)
Where JobChange and Migration are discrete variables or sets of variables that capture the
information on individuals’ job changing and migrating. In the analysis, different specifications
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for JobChange and Migration are considered, taking into account when they occurred and, in
the case of migration, towards what area.
To keep the analysis simple, we focus on the first migration spell without considering if an
individual migrated more than once. In our data around 50% of the movers migrates once,
30% twice and the rest more times.3 Migration is included in the equation only through the
interaction term with JobChange. In order to obtain the effect of migration on wages we need
to compare migrants with the best possible control group. Since migration usually coincides
with changing occupation, the most appropriate control group is those individuals who change
job but do not migrate. This choice is common in literature.
Taking first differences removes the fixed effects φl, υi and, under the assumption of exogeneity,
OLS gives an unbiased estimation of the effect of migration on wages.
We assume that, once controlled for fixed effects, migration is exogenous. The presence of
time varying self-selection is not proven in the literature. Nakosteen and Zimmer [1980, 1982],
Robinson and Tomes [1982] and Gabriel and Schmitz [1995] find evidence of positive self-selection
into migration; while Hunt and Kau [1985] and Borjas et al. [1992] find no evidence. In more
recent papers, De´tang-Dessendre et al. [2004] find some evidence of self-selection for individuals
with college degree while they cannot find any for lower educated; Yankow [2003] finds that, for
low educated workers, instrumenting migration reduces the magnitude of the positive immediate
effect of migrating on wage growth by less than 1% and reduces the significance of the coefficient
from 5% to 10%, which cannot be considered a strong evidence in favor of self-selection. Besides,
in both Yankow [2003] and Bo¨heim and Taylor [2007] time invariant self-selection is assumed
when studying the effect of migration on successive years wage.
We present the results of the estimation of model (3.2) in Table 3.2. The coefficients of the
other regressors included in the model are presented in Table C.1 of the Appendix. We present
four specifications for migration in Table 3.2. In column (1) we just consider if the individual
migrates, in column (2) we add the area of destination of the first migration, in columns (3) and
(4) we also include if first migration took place in the first five years of career or afterwards.
The results show that first migration has a positive significant effect on individuals’ wage growth
only if it has North as destination. Moreover it is only important if it takes place in the first
five years of career. These results show that it is essential to consider when migration took place
and towards what area. Considering just migration as in column (1) would suggest there is not
a significant affect of migration on wages. Considering just the time in which migration takes
place as in column (3) would suggest a significant average positive effect of migrating in the first
five years, while this is true only for individuals who migrate to the North.
3It could be interesting to study if individuals who migrate twice have a different wage outcome than those
who migrate only once. We leave this analysis as future work.
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Table 3.2: Difference analysis
Dependent variable:
log(weekly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
change job −0.063 −0.062
(0.048) (0.048)
change job×area 0.074
(0.046)
change job×area to N. 0.148∗∗∗
(0.053)
change job×area to C. 0.032
(0.064)
change job×area to S. −0.029
(0.061)
change job yr.1-5 −0.040∗ −0.041∗∗
(0.021) (0.021)
change job yr.6-10 0.028 0.029
(0.024) (0.024)
change job×area yr.1-5 0.103∗
(0.054)
change job×area yr.6-10 0.046
(0.050)
change job×area yr.1-5 to N. 0.207∗∗∗
(0.061)
change job×area yr. 1-5 to C. 0.020
(0.086)
change job×area yr.1-5 to S. −0.104
(0.079)
change job×area yr.6-10 to N. 0.068
(0.061)
change job×area yr.6-10 to C. 0.036
(0.078)
change job×area yr.6-10 to S. 0.027
(0.079)
R2 0.226 0.228 0.228 0.232
Adj. R2 0.223 0.225 0.224 0.228
Num. obs. 2818 2818 2818 2818
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variable is the difference between the log weekly wage at experience 11 minus log weekly wage
at experience 1. The other regressors included in the model and not in the table are the differences of: job spells
held, the number of times the worker changed working area, the square of the age, the actual experience held
and its square, the tenure in the current job and its square, a dummy indicating if the main occupation held
by the individual is part-time, the main occupation, the sector of the main occupation, year dummy variables
(from 1988 to 1993 the possible staring years), a set of interactions between the year dummy variables and areas
dummy variables. For dummies, the reference area is North, year is 1987, occupation is Apprentices, sector is
Industry.
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Columns (3) and (4) of the table also suggest that individuals who do not change job in the
first five years of career have a significantly higher wage growth at the end of the period. This
indicates that individuals who find a stable occupation at the beginning of their career enjoy a
larger income growth in the long run. This finding is in line with theories on work specific human
capital accumulation: to have a stable occupation allows to build a specific human capital that
individuals with erratic works cannot develop. This human capital accumulation will result in
a higher wage growth. This finding is also in line with the results by Light and McGarry [1998]
who find lower wage paths for individuals who undergo persistent job mobility.
3.3.2 The effect on the wage of the years following migration
We use dynamic panel fixed effect techniques to study the consequences of the first migration
on successive years wage. The model we estimate is:
wilt =
A∑
z=1
ρzwilt−z +
P∑
j=1
θ1jJobChangeit−j +
P∑
j=1
θ2jJobChangeit−j (3.3)
×Migrationit−j +Xiltβ + φl + υi + γt + ilt;
where Xilt includes the number of job spells held at time t, the number of times the worker
changed working area, the age and its square, experience square, the actual experience held, the
tenure in the current job, a dummy indicating if the main occupation held by the individual at
time t is part-time, dummies for the main occupation and the sector at time t.
In this framework, θ2j is the effect of the first migration on the wage of j years later. Since we
assume job changing and migration take place at the end of the year, the effect of changing area
on the wage of the same year is not included.
We again assume that, once controlled for fixed effects, migration is exogenous and estimate the
model by means of Arellano-Bond estimator using lags three to seven as instruments. We tried
different specifications of the model including up to three legs of the autoregressive component.
The estimated parameters are robust to the different specifications. Using an AR(1) specification
for wages the null of iid residuals in levels is rejected, while with an AR(2) and an AR(3) it is
not. We report the results of the AR(2) specification.
We use all the available observations for each individual considered in the previous analysis.
This results in an unbalanced panel in which individuals have from 11 to 18 years of maximum
experience.
Including an AR(2) process for wages and Arellano-Bond methodology lead to exclude the first
three observations for each individual causing to not consider those migrations that happen in
the first three years of experience. The different experience window considered makes the results
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of this analysis not comparable with the one of the previous section. In this analysis we consider
those migrations that take place between the fourth and the seventeenth year of experience,
while before we considered from year one to ten. The individuals in the sample we are using in
this analysis have larger experience, we include years of experience not considered before (from
the twelfth to the eighteenth) and we lose the first three years of career.
We consider up to five lags for migration and the destination area. We present the estimation
of equation (3.3) in Table 3.3. The rest of the estimated parameters are presented in Table C.2
in the Appendix. Overall, migration does not have a significant effect on the salaries up to five
years later. The only exception is a negative significant effect of migrating towards the South
on the wage of the first year following migration. As in the previous analysis, not considering
the destination of the migration, e.g. columns (1) and (3), would result in a non significant
estimated effect of migration on future wages. In the previous analysis we find a positive effect
of migrating towards North before the sixth year of career on the ten years wage growth. In
here we do not include in the analysis the first three years of career, this may cause the loss of
the positive effect of migrating to the North on wages. The immediate effect of changing job
on the successive year wage is positive and significant. The difference in the sign of the effect
of changing job on wages in comparison with the previous analysis can be explained in terms of
the different experience window we are considering: here more experienced individuals with a
larger set of skills and a more stable occupation are considered.
Negative contemporaneous returns to migration on wages between the first and second job for
high school dropouts were found by Ham et al. [2011], while they do not find any significant
effect for individuals with high school degree and other education levels.
3.4 Concluding remarks
In this work we study the effect of internal migration on the wages of Italian young males. First
we focus on the effect of the first migration on wage growth in the first eleven years of career,
finding a positive significant effect of the first migration when it takes place in the first five
years of career and towards the North. Successively we study the effect of migration on the
five successive year wages through a dynamic model and find an immediate significant negative
effect of migrating to the South.
The two analyses show the importance of considering the destination of the migration spell and
its timing. In both analysis, not accounting for the destination and the timing would lead to
non significant effects of migration.
The results suggest that migrating to the North has a positive impact on wage growth while
migrating to the South has a negative immediate impact on wages. These results may be
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Table 3.3: Dynamic fixed effects model.
Dependent variable:
log(weekly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
change jobt−1 0.048∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
change jobt−2 0.008 0.007
(0.006) (0.006)
change jobt−3 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
change jobt−4 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
change jobt−5 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
change job×areat−1 −0.030 −0.040
(0.025) (0.035)
change job×areat−2 −0.003
(0.027)
change job×areat−3 −0.012
(0.023)
change job×areat−4 −0.014
(0.019)
change job×areat−5 −0.015
(0.015)
change job×area to N.t−1 0.041 0.042
(0.037) (0.046)
change job×area to C.t−1 −0.065 −0.088
(0.058) (0.081)
change job×area to S.t−1 −0.110∗∗ −0.122∗
(0.035) (0.055)
change job×area to N.t−2 0.030
(0.040)
change job×area to C.t−2 −0.048
(0.057)
change job×area to S.t−2 −0.007
(0.044)
change job×area to N.t−3 0.000
(0.035)
change job×area to C.t−3 0.007
(0.029)
change job×area to S.t−3 −0.039
(0.050)
change job×area to N.t−4 0.000
(0.025)
change job×area to C.t−4 −0.004
(0.027)
change job×area to S.t−4 −0.034
(0.053)
change job×area to N.t−5 −0.011
(0.017)
change job×area to C.t−5 −0.037
(0.025)
change job×area to S.t−5 0.011
(0.047)
Num. obs. used 26888 17600 26888 17600
Sargan Test: p-value 0.170 0.824 0.176 0.792
Wald Test Coefficients: p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Autocorrelation test (1): p-value 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.027
Autocorrelation test (2): p-value 0.256 0.608 0.270 0.688
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Arellano-Bond estimator with lags 3 to 7 as instruments. The other regressors included in the model are the
number of job spells held at time t, the number of times the worker changed working area, the age and its
square, experience square, the actual experience held, the tenure in the current job, a dummy indicating if the
main occupation held by the individual at time t is part-time, the main occupation at t, the sector of the main
occupation. For dummies, the reference area is North, occupation is Apprentices, sector is Industry.
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expected. It is known that the North of Italy is richer and with a better wage mobility than the
South. Further, in the analysis we consider individuals with maximum high school education
and these individuals are the most affected by the economic environment they live in.4 If an
individual’s wage growth depends on the economic environment he lives in, then moving to a
richer and more dynamic area will have a positive effect on the evolution of his salaries.
The analysis could be extended in several ways. In this paper it was assumed that, once ac-
counted for individual fixed effect, migration self selection is constant. Although the empirical
evidence in the literature is not clear, time varying self-selection is a plausible assumption and
it can be argued it should been considered. The most straightforward way to solve the problem
would be to find a time varying instrument. The time varying instrument is needed because of
the use of difference and fixed effect approaches. We have as only instrument a binary variable
that takes value one if the individual starts to work in the same province where he was born.
This variable is a measure of the cost of migrating and it is negatively correlated with migra-
tion. However it cannot be used in the analysis as it is since it is time invariant. A possible way
to address the problem is by substituting the migration binary variable by a propensity score
estimated by a probit model. With this approach the model remains identified when using a
first difference or fixed effect estimator also if the instrument is time invariant because of the
non linear transformation given by the probit. However the application of this approach to our
model specifications is not straightforward and needs further investigation.
We considered areas North, South, Centre. With this choice, an individual who lives on the
boundary of an area could result as migrant just going to work for a company at the other side
of the boundary, without migrating. This problem could be solved removing the area Centre
from the analysis or using another definition of migration. An interesting definition of migration
could be obtained by using distances: for example an individual migrates if he moves to a
province more than 100 km away from the one he used to work in. In order to implement such
as definition of migration it would be necessary to construct the database with the distances
among Italian provinces. We leave this as future work.
The analysis could also be extended considering the effect of migration on other covariates
such as number of weeks worked per year or yearly income. The analysis of these outcome
would complement the analysis, although it would present the same self-selection issues reported
above.
4Individuals with higher education have more working opportunities and can choose among them. The fact of
having a choice makes individuals more independent from the economic environment compared to others that do
not have any.
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A.1 Tables
Table A.1: Regional income and age moments of the active population.
min 1st q med mean 3rd q max
Inc. North 2004 0 12000 15000 17210 20000 100000
Inc. North 2008 0 14000 17360 19300 22000 79500
Inc. South 2004 0 10000 14000 14300 18000 60000
Inc. South 2008 0 11130 16000 16440 20000 60000
Age North 2004 16 35 42 41 48 67
Age South 2004 16 37 45 43 50 68
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of
Italy.
Table A.2: National Income Quantiles of the active population.
Quantiles: 0 1/3 2/3 1
Inc. 2004 0 12500 17000 100000
Inc. 2008 0 15000 19542 79500
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank
of Italy.
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Table A.3: Probit estimates.
cl. 2004 cl. 2008 c age age*d(s) age2
1 1 1.885 -0.065 0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.045) (0.116) (0.139)
1 2 -1.382 0.030 -0.005 0.000
(0.034) (0.403) (0.111) (0.454)
1 3 -3.820 0.117 -0.004 -0.001
(0.000) (0.012) (0.231) (0.048)
2 1 1.748 -0.113 0.000 0.001
(0.058) (0.014) (0.890) (0.020)
2 2 -1.568 0.082 0.000 -0.001
(0.085) (0.071) (0.835) (0.059)
2 3 -1.692 0.035 0.001 0.000
(0.101) (0.494) (0.794) (0.664)
3 1 -0.343 -0.034 0.007 0.000
(0.825) (0.634) (0.018) (0.696)
3 2 -0.543 0.004 0.005 0.000
(0.703) (0.948) (0.080) (0.737)
3 3 -0.493 0.027 -0.008 0.000
(0.704) (0.652) (0.001) (0.883)
P-values are reported below coefficients.
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank
of Italy using the panel.
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Figure A.1: Conditional transition probabilities
(a) Cl 1 to 1. (b) Cl 1 to 2.
(c) Cl 1 to 3. (d) Cl 2 to 1.
(e) Cl 2 to 2. (f) Cl 2 to 3.
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 1 50
(g) Cl 3 to 1. (h) Cl 3 to 2.
(i) Cl 3 to 3.
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using the panel
sample. The conditional transition probabilities were estimated with the methodology described
in section 2; with the Epanechnikov kernel,the bandwidths as in the Monte Carlo simulation and
weight 5. The reported values are obtained through a moving average of 9 elements of the estimated
probabilities.
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Figure A.2: Conditional transition probabilities for education classes.
(a) Cl 1 to 1. (b) Cl 1 to 2.
(c) Cl 2 to 1. (d) Cl 2 to 2.
(e) Cl 1 to 1 comp. ed. (f) Cl 1 to 2 comp. ed.
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(g) Cl 2 to 1 comp. ed. (h) Cl 2 to 2 comp. ed.
(i) Cl 1 to 1 high ed. (j) Cl 1 to 2 high ed.
(k) Cl 2 to 1 high ed. (l) Cl 2 to 2 high ed.
Source: authors’ calculation from the historical archive of SHIW by Bank of Italy using the panel
sample. The conditional transition probabilities were estimated with the methodology described
in section 2; with the Epanechnikov kernel,the bandwidths as in the Monte Carlo simulation and
weight 5. The reported values are obtained through a moving average of 9 elements of the estimated
probabilities.
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B.1 Demographic analysis
Table B.1: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, South, high education
(a) With apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.693 0.485 0.585 0.073
20 0.183 0.089 0.200 0.076
21 0.062 0.504 0.351 0.165
22 0.731 0.325 0.512 0.154
23 0.512 0.702 1.000 0.074
24 0.892 0.352 0.900 0.080
25 1.000 0.036 0.602 0.032
26 0.440 0.379 0.397 0.926
(b) Without apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.583 0.440 0.500 0.054
20 0.787 0.024 0.098 0.074
21 0.035 0.259 0.730 0.066
22 0.441 0.238 0.642 0.076
23 0.826 0.926 1.000 0.334
24 0.702 0.140 0.905 0.030
25 1.000 0.040 0.587 0.025
26 0.435 0.147 0.384 0.857
(c) Replacing apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.830 0.655 0.382 0.156
20 0.819 0.090 0.054 0.108
21 0.075 0.203 0.859 0.133
22 0.687 0.168 0.798 0.096
23 0.754 0.922 1.000 0.328
24 0.724 0.140 0.911 0.035
25 1.000 0.041 0.615 0.033
26 0.411 0.143 0.396 0.866
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age and starting
class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
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Table B.2: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, South, high education
(a) With apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 0.517 0.401 0.553 0.882
21 22 0.075 0.161 0.186 0.021
23 24 0.561 0.440 0.715 0.053
25 26 0.684 0.015 0.558 0.300
(b) Without apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.213 0.333 0.664
21 22 0.039 0.064 0.867 0.006
23 24 0.535 0.289 0.867 0.066
25 26 0.683 0.011 0.584 0.175
(c) Replacing apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 0.524 0.369 0.362 0.374
21 22 0.087 0.068 0.766 0.012
23 24 0.541 0.289 0.829 0.064
25 26 0.674 0.010 0.559 0.166
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age class and
starting class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
Table B.3: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, North, high education
(a) With apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.705 0.513 0.590 0.063
20 0.171 0.085 0.189 0.092
21 0.067 0.492 0.341 0.164
22 0.747 0.319 0.525 0.138
23 0.536 0.705 1.000 0.058
24 0.878 0.323 0.890 0.079
25 1.000 0.042 0.582 0.033
26 0.439 0.396 0.388 0.931
(b) Without apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.565 0.471 0.488 0.064
20 0.775 0.029 0.088 0.070
21 0.028 0.240 0.724 0.066
22 0.439 0.202 0.631 0.083
23 0.824 0.908 1.000 0.341
24 0.727 0.137 0.905 0.030
25 1.000 0.032 0.581 0.025
26 0.419 0.124 0.382 0.853
(c) Replacing apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.832 0.593 0.357 0.136
20 0.819 0.105 0.063 0.100
21 0.077 0.206 0.858 0.123
22 0.689 0.174 0.805 0.083
23 0.749 0.927 1.000 0.338
24 0.693 0.150 0.907 0.034
25 1.000 0.043 0.583 0.032
26 0.430 0.140 0.378 0.859
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age and starting
class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
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Table B.4: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, North, high education
(a) With apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 0.529 0.397 0.544 0.877
21 22 0.077 0.161 0.184 0.021
23 24 0.555 0.433 0.684 0.050
25 26 0.688 0.018 0.590 0.311
(b) Without apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.237 0.344 0.674
21 22 0.028 0.063 0.854 0.009
23 24 0.541 0.282 0.857 0.078
25 26 0.695 0.009 0.559 0.157
(c) Replacing apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 0.514 0.388 0.356 0.373
21 22 0.091 0.060 0.757 0.009
23 24 0.564 0.287 0.823 0.068
25 26 0.661 0.010 0.571 0.162
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age class and
starting class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
B.2 Potential experience
Table B.5: Starting experience distribution in the subgroups of analysis
Italy whole North high Center high South high Italy low
starting exper. 86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92 86-88 90-92
1 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.32
2 0.31 0.34 0.27 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.36
3 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.31 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.33
Table B.6: Test for potential experience at start.
North high Center high South high Italy low
cl1 0.007 0.786 0.029 0.016
cl2 0.000 0.042 0.307 0.807
cl3 0.344 0.279 1.000 0.508
all cl. 0.000 0.150 0.031 0.009
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for experience at start, for the subgroups of analysis and starting class. The
null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution of experience at start between subgroups.
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B.3 Regional Unemployment Rates
Figure B.1: Regional Unemployment Rates.
Sources: Young males unemployment rate from ISTAT (www.istat.it).
B.4 Schools Enrollment Rates
Figure B.2: Primary, secondary and tertiary education gross enrollment rates for males in Italy.
Source: World Development Indicators database by the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/).
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B.5 Robustness checks
B.5.1 Changing the first spell definition
We control if the results are robust to our definition of first spell. In our analysis, an individual
enters the labor market with a first spell of at least 12 weeks outside periods characterized by
seasonal work. Now we reduce the number of weeks to 4; we include all the possible spells that
are not strictly seasonal1. Our results are robust to the different definition of first spell.
From Table B.7 and from Tables B.8 and B.9 we see that the demographic analysis results
are close to those obtained in the original and we can investigate wage mobility on the same
subgroups we use above, running the unconditional test on the subgroups with high education
and the unconditional on the subgroup with low education.
We report the results of the comparison between the two groups transition probabilities in Table
B.10. The signs of the differences and their significance level are similar to those in the main
analysis.
Table B.8: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, South, high education - Changing the first spell definition.
(a) With apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.862 0.543 1.000 0.398
20 0.842 1.000 1.000 0.950
21 0.031 0.529 0.591 0.045
22 0.759 0.159 0.684 0.427
23 0.909 1.000 0.112 0.630
24 0.013 0.371 0.744 0.051
(b) Without apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.324
20 0.655 1.000 1.000 1.000
21 0.049 1.000 0.574 0.089
22 0.746 0.070 0.665 0.203
23 0.886 1.000 0.131 0.494
24 0.012 0.257 0.744 0.015
(c) Replacing apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 1.000 0.625 1.000 0.325
20 0.666 1.000 1.000 1.000
21 0.113 1.000 0.601 0.132
22 0.759 0.073 0.665 0.202
23 0.876 1.000 0.124 0.436
24 0.007 0.411 0.741 0.022
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age and starting
class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
1This choice is also done by Del Bono and Vuri (2011)
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Table B.9: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, South, high education - Changing the first spell definition.
(a) With apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.814 1.000 0.652
21 22 0.097 0.372 1.000 0.046
23 24 0.060 0.581 0.155 0.047
(b) Without apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.644
21 22 0.109 0.158 1.000 0.023
23 24 0.022 0.345 0.184 0.025
(c) Replacing apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.487 1.000 0.371
21 22 0.192 0.249 1.000 0.045
23 24 0.021 0.449 0.166 0.023
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age class and
starting class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
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Table B.10: Comparison of wage mobility - Changing the first spell definition.
(a) Short run: periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff 0.013** -0.021 0.040** -0.036**
p-value 0.025 0.160 0.020 0.048
class 1 to 3 Prob diff 0.014 0.018** 0.007 -0.002
p-value 0.645 0.040 0.555 0.802
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.025** -0.010** 0.038* 0.000
p-value 0.010 0.045 0.075 0.991
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.038** 0.142** -0.005 0.001
p-value 0.005 0.000 0.110 0.970
(b) Long run: periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff -0.032 0.052 -0.010 0.045**
p-value 0.455 0.160 0.555 0.023
class 1 to 3 Prob diff -0.041** -0.104** -0.049** -0.034**
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.030** 0.094** 0.056** 0.023
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.457
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.066** -0.095** 0.001 -0.095*
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.375 0.061
(c) Successive years: periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff -0.076** 0.072** -0.034** 0.062**
p-value 0.000 0.010 0.025 0.021
class 1 to 3 Prob diff -0.025 -0.085** -0.027** -0.024
p-value 0.160 0.005 0.015 0.191
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.016** 0.071** 0.073** 0.004
p-value 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.817
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.048** -0.079** -0.100** -0.051*
p-value 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.066
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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B.5.2 Analysis on five classes of income
We run the analysis considering five classes of income to check if the results are robust to the
choice of 3 classes of income and to the definition of the class boundaries. We focus the analysis
on the individuals that entered in the first three classes of the wage distribution, who are around
80% of the total sample.
The results of the demographic analysis are presented in Table B.11 and suggest to use the
conditional test only for the sub-group North, high education. The null hypothesis of the
equality of probability distributions is not rejected for occupation overall the subgroups and
for age in the other sub-groups than North, high education.
The signs and amplitude of the differences between transition probabilities are similar to those of
the original analysis. However, increasing the number of classes implies a reduction of observa-
tions available for each transition and the power of the tests decreases considerably making the
p-values not comparable. While there is not a clear pattern between the two groups in the first
four years of career, the wage mobility of the low unemployment group 90-92 becomes clearly
more positive in the first ten years of career and from the fifth to the tenth year.
Table B.12 reports the results of the short run analysis. Out of 36 upward probabilities 13
differences are higher for group 86-88, with 2 significant at least at 10%, and 13 are for group
90-92, with 5 significant. The others are lower than 0.01. Out of 12 downwards probabilities,
6 are higher for group 86-88, with 2 significant and 2 for group 90-92, with none significant.
We report the results for the first ten years of career in Table B.13. In the table, 21 out of 36
upwards probabilities are higher for the low unemployment group 90-92, with 5 significant. Only
7 are higher for the high unemployment group, with 2 significant. Focusing on the probabilities
of reaching class 4 and 5 of the wage distribution, 20 out of 24 probabilities are higher for group
90-92, with 5 significant, and 2 are higher for group 86-88, with none significant. Also the
magnitude of the differences is important, reaching 5% or above in 9 out of 20 probabilities. For
what concerns downwards probabilities, 8 out of 12 are higher in group 86-88, with 3 significant,
and none is higher for group 90-92. Similar results can be found in Table B.14, where the results
of the analysis from year five to ten of career are reported.
In conclusion, the analysis on five classes of wage mobility confirms the results of the original
on three classes. As expected, taking five classes reduces the power of the tests and the results
are statistically less significant than the previous analysis.
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Table B.12: Comparison of wage mobility - Five classes of income - Short run: periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff -0.093** -0.091 0.001 0.028
p-value 0.015 0.217 0.976 0.165
class 1 to 3 diff 0.013 -0.037 -0.010 -0.006
p-value 0.865 0.553 0.762 0.717
class 1 to 4 diff 0.039 -0.042 -0.007 -0.002
p-value 0.175 0.321 0.728 0.846
class 1 to 5 diff 0.017** 0.010 0.008 -0.004
p-value 0.000 0.743 0.580 0.254
class 2 to 1 diff 0.008* 0.049 0.016 -0.009
p-value 0.060 0.185 0.682 0.735
class 2 to 3 diff 0.002 0.017 -0.024 -0.105**
p-value 0.185 0.745 0.564 0.006
class 2 to 4 diff -0.034** -0.014 0.005 0.029
p-value 0.000 0.709 0.842 0.266
class 2 to 5 diff -0.005 0.018 0.001 0.012
p-value 0.100 0.499 0.942 0.178
class 3 to 1 diff 0.013** 0.044 0.007 -0.037
p-value 0.005 0.129 0.872 0.264
class 3 to 2 diff 0.039** -0.045 -0.008 0.013
p-value 0.000 0.288 0.860 0.807
class 3 to 4 diff -0.094** 0.027 0.025 -0.073
p-value 0.000 0.639 0.630 0.243
class 3 to 5 diff -0.028** 0.018 -0.012 0.010
p-value 0.000 0.583 0.673 0.701
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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Table B.13: Comparison of wage mobility - Five classes of income - Long run: periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff 0.059 0.016 0.074 -0.000
p-value 0.140 0.812 0.089 0.993
class 1 to 3 diff -0.002 0.058 -0.028 0.049**
p-value 0.030 0.422 0.518 0.016
class 1 to 4 diff -0.027** -0.112* -0.011 -0.006
p-value 0.000 0.067 0.752 0.734
class 1 to 5 diff -0.057 -0.023 -0.018 -0.024**
p-value 0.260 0.605 0.370 0.037
class 2 to 1 diff -0.005 0.007 0.088** 0.011
p-value 0.650 0.814 0.009 0.578
class 2 to 3 diff 0.028** 0.026 0.011 -0.006
p-value 0.005 0.666 0.819 0.869
class 2 to 4 diff -0.004 -0.058 -0.012 -0.031
p-value 0.580 0.258 0.750 0.436
class 2 to 5 diff -0.049** -0.048 -0.037 -0.017
p-value 0.000 0.237 0.111 0.516
class 3 to 1 diff 0.035** 0.040 0.002 0.010
p-value 0.000 0.171 0.949 0.741
class 3 to 2 diff 0.042** 0.031 0.035 -0.004
p-value 0.000 0.449 0.453 0.933
class 3 to 4 diff -0.018 -0.049 -0.015 -0.078
p-value 0.240 0.427 0.806 0.247
class 3 to 5 diff -0.094** -0.071 0.049 0.013
p-value 0.000 0.200 0.261 0.810
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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Table B.14: Comparison of wage mobility - Five classes of income - Successive years: periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff 0.043** 0.024 -0.038 0.056
p-value 0.050 0.809 0.487 0.158
class 1 to 3 diff -0.016 0.021 -0.021 0.030
p-value 0.285 0.796 0.661 0.392
class 1 to 4 diff -0.008 0.006 0.024 -0.011
p-value 0.250 0.931 0.523 0.707
class 1 to 5 diff 0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.003
p-value 0.295 0.924 0.819 0.799
class 2 to 1 diff 0.007 -0.011 0.039** 0.011**
p-value 0.260 0.620 0.020 0.000
class 2 to 3 diff 0.011* 0.056 0.035 0.020
p-value 0.075 0.394 0.494 0.520
class 2 to 4 diff -0.076** -0.067 -0.091** -0.008
p-value 0.000 0.204 0.022 0.755
class 2 to 5 diff -0.014** -0.020 -0.001 -0.042**
p-value 0.025 0.515 0.962 0.005
class 3 to 1 diff 0.003** 0.011 0.035 0.003
p-value 0.035 0.596 0.147 0.827
class 3 to 2 diff -0.000 0.066* 0.065 -0.010
p-value 0.015 0.065 0.151 0.689
class 3 to 4 diff -0.012 -0.114** -0.060 -0.038
p-value 0.500 0.058 0.266 0.306
class 3 to 5 diff -0.016** -0.036 0.025 -0.015
p-value 0.050 0.370 0.357 0.542
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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B.5.3 Select adjacent periods
To check if the results of our analysis depend on the two groups selection, we replicate the
analysis using period 87-89 as high unemployment and period 91-93 as low unemployment.
The results confirm those obtained with the original periods: the lower unemployment group
enjoys a more positive income mobility, mainly for what concerns reaching the top class of the
wage distribution. However there is one main distinction: the difference in the wage mobility
seems to be clear since the first four years of potential experience, while with periods 86-88
and 90-92 it was not. This difference in timing could be due to the fact that when individuals
enter in 91-93 the low unemployment period has already started since one year and their initial
entry conditions are even more positive than for group 90-92 (figure 2.2 shows they have higher
wages).
Table B.15 and Tables B.16-B.19 show the results of the demographic analysis. They are similar
to those obtained with the original groups, except that we do not need to use the conditional test
for comparing the transition probabilities in the subgroup Center, high education. The results
on the wage mobility analysis are reported in Table B.20. In the short run subtable, 8 out of
12 upward probabilities have a negative difference, of which 6 are statistically significant. All 4
downward probabilities have a positive sign and 3 are significant. The results of the long run
analysis are similar to those of the original periods. Finally we obtain less significantly different
transition probabilities in the years of potential experience successive to the first four compared
to the original analysis.
Table B.16: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, North, high education - Select adjacent periods.
(a) With apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.211 0.921 0.012 0.477
20 0.437 0.032 1.000 0.019
21 0.809 0.834 0.477 0.493
22 0.133 0.247 0.007 0.711
23 0.886 0.011 0.303 0.521
24 0.468 0.831 0.570 0.885
(b) Without apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.299 0.762 0.146 0.636
20 0.371 0.118 1.000 0.037
21 1.000 1.000 0.456 0.431
22 0.184 0.287 0.006 0.607
23 0.784 0.025 0.331 0.634
24 1.000 0.679 0.565 1.000
(c) Replacing apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 0.204 0.918 0.014 0.478
20 0.451 0.036 1.000 0.016
21 0.793 0.845 0.469 0.532
22 0.128 0.219 0.006 0.704
23 0.885 0.009 0.352 0.529
24 0.448 0.843 0.586 0.874
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age and starting
class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
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Table B.17: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, North, high education - Select adjacent periods.
(a) With apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 0.765 0.098 0.236 0.318
21 22 0.579 0.336 0.004 0.499
23 24 1.000 0.046 0.944 0.445
(b) Without apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.116 0.595 0.180
21 22 0.331 0.372 0.010 0.291
23 24 1.000 0.071 0.955 0.532
(c) Replacing apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 0.784 0.112 0.235 0.325
21 22 0.599 0.313 0.003 0.509
23 24 1.000 0.044 0.957 0.442
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age class and
starting class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
Table B.18: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, South, high education - Select adjacent periods.
(a) With apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 1.000 0.541 1.000 0.639
20 0.719 0.499 0.430 0.381
21 0.620 0.259 0.634 0.408
22 0.271 0.110 1.000 0.062
23 0.533 0.821 1.000 0.742
24 0.068 0.192 0.736 0.017
(b) Without apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.403
20 0.241 0.255 0.369 0.361
21 1.000 0.684 1.000 0.647
22 0.292 0.284 1.000 0.144
23 0.348 0.809 1.000 0.631
24 0.058 0.192 0.718 0.016
(c) Replacing apprentices
age cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 1.000 0.547 1.000 0.645
20 0.718 0.477 0.425 0.353
21 0.630 0.250 0.631 0.406
22 0.303 0.095 1.000 0.064
23 0.553 0.825 1.000 0.755
24 0.059 0.200 0.730 0.011
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age and starting
class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
Table B.19: Chi-squared test on occupation for age classes, South, high education - Select adjacent periods.
(a) With apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.645 1.000 0.865
21 22 0.223 0.030 1.000 0.058
23 24 0.057 0.407 0.872 0.055
(b) Without apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.680 1.000 1.000
21 22 0.326 0.283 1.000 0.145
23 24 0.050 0.408 0.870 0.029
(c) Replacing apprentices
age l age h cl1 cl2 cl3 all cl.
19 20 1.000 0.629 1.000 0.843
21 22 0.208 0.027 1.000 0.056
23 24 0.064 0.395 0.874 0.050
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for type of occupation between the two subgroups, for each age class and
starting class. The null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution.
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Table B.20: Comparison of wage mobility - Select adjacent periods.
(a) Short run: periods 90-94 and 94-98 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff -0.011 0.067 -0.067** -0.038**
p-value 0.670 0.231 0.000 0.053
class 1 to 3 Prob diff -0.066** -0.043 -0.020** 0.004
p-value 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.652
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.055** 0.061* 0.080** 0.022
p-value 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.566
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.070** 0.009 -0.095** 0.002
p-value 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.966
(b) Long run: periods 90-00 and 94-04 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff -0.043* 0.079 -0.039** 0.050**
p-value 0.110 0.181 0.035 0.017
class 1 to 3 Prob diff -0.053** -0.023 -0.066** -0.037**
p-value 0.005 0.666 0.000 0.042
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.030** 0.027 0.092** -0.032
p-value 0.000 0.411 0.000 0.365
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.117** -0.079* -0.089** -0.028
p-value 0.000 0.115 0.005 0.603
(c) Successive years: periods 94-00 and 98-04 respectively
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff -0.045* 0.051 -0.025* 0.055*
p-value 0.065 0.481 0.055 0.056
class 1 to 3 Prob diff 0.026 -0.107** -0.018 -0.019
p-value 0.265 0.025 0.200 0.370
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.005 -0.031 0.085** -0.002
p-value 0.220 0.292 0.000 0.928
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.032** -0.050 -0.047** -0.078**
p-value 0.030 0.316 0.040 0.009
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 87-89 (high un-
employment) minus group 91-93 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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B.5.4 Age up to 22
We restrict the sample to individuals up to 22 years old. With such as restriction we exclude
individuals with a degree and limit the possibility of observing individuals who became private
non-agricultural employees from another type of work.
The restriction on the age reduces the samples size considerably and lower significantly the
power of the tests for comparing transition probabilities. The results on the long run upwards
probability to class three are confirmed by the analysis; the others are not contradicted (the
signs are as expected, but we reject less the null of equality).
In Table B.21 we present the demographic analysis on those subgroups that are affected by the
sampling restriction. We never reject the null of independence between the two groups and
we can use the unconditional test in order to compare transition probabilities. We report the
results of the analysis in Table B.22. From the table, we can see that the sign of the differences
between group 86-88 and 90-92 are overall in line with those of the original analysis. We reject
the hypothesis of equality for 3 of the upwards probabilities to the top class in the long run
analysis and for 4 in the analysis on the successive periods.
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Table B.22: Comparison of wage mobility - Age up to 22.
(a) Short run: periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff 0.028 -0.074 0.023 -0.036**
p-value 0.532 0.303 0.618 0.048
class 1 to 3 Prob diff -0.016 0.048 -0.016 0.000
p-value 0.568 0.226 0.432 0.955
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.007 -0.023 0.007 0.003
p-value 0.738 0.673 0.923 0.951
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.012 0.066 -0.002 0.009
p-value 0.731 0.344 0.970 0.812
(b) Long run: periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff -0.011 0.034 0.005 0.050**
p-value 0.815 0.635 0.929 0.014
class 1 to 3 Prob diff -0.049 -0.079 -0.054 -0.037**
p-value 0.267 0.205 0.164 0.026
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.031 -0.011 0.078 0.027
p-value 0.131 0.839 0.163 0.396
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.080** -0.071 -0.083 -0.086*
p-value 0.030 0.371 0.267 0.099
(c) Successive years: periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
High educ. Low Education
North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 Prob diff -0.080 0.055 -0.006 0.066**
p-value 0.202 0.540 0.926 0.017
class 1 to 3 Prob diff -0.022 -0.045 -0.006 -0.031**
p-value 0.658 0.522 0.852 0.099
class 2 to 1 Prob diff 0.026 0.049 0.059 0.002
p-value 0.160 0.262 0.234 0.929
class 2 to 3 Prob diff -0.079** -0.068 -0.168** -0.054**
p-value 0.036 0.324 0.006 0.053
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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B.5.5 Considering groups 87-88 and 91-92
We redefine our groups of analysis: individuals who enter the labor market in years 1987 and
1988 belong to the higher unemployment group, while those who enter in years 1991 and 1992
belong to the lower unemployment group. The objective of the sample reduction is to obtain
more homogeneous groups of analysis in terms of demographic characteristics and potential
experience at start. The results of the demographic analysis in Table B.24 and of the potential
starting experience in Table B.25 confirm the equality of the probability distribution for all
covariates; with the exception of age at entry for sub-panel North high education. With this
sample reduction, we loose around one third of the panels size: 1,686 and 1,431 individuals from
the higher and the lower unemployment groups respectively. This loss of observations reduces
the power in testing.
We present the results of the analysis on wage mobility in Table B.26. The periods of analysis are
the same than in the original. Following the results of the demographic analysis in Table B.24,
we apply our conditional test only to the subgroup North, high education. The unconditional
test is used for all the other subgroups. The results are similar to those of our original analysis
in terms of the signs and the magnitudes of the differences between transition probabilities, in
any period considered. As expected, the power of the tests reduces and we reject overall less the
null hypothesis of equality of transition probabilities.
In conclusion, our results are not affected by the eventual heterogeneity that we introduce by
gathering in one group individuals who enter the labor market in three successive years, both in
terms of the demographic characteristics and potential experience at start. Instead, considering
larger samples increases significantly the power of the tests.
Table B.23: Comparison of the proportion of the different types of first occupation, education, first area of work for groups
87-88 91-92, and sample sizes.
Italy whole North high Center high South high Italy low
87-88 90-91 87-88 90-91 87-88 90-91 87-88 90-91 87-88 90-91
Apprentices 0.39 0.31 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.86 0.85
Blue collars 0.45 0.48 0.62 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.77 0.71 0.14 0.15
Executives 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Man. & white collars 0.16 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.00
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Low 0.41 0.34
High 0.59 0.66
North 0.56 0.65 0.67 0.68
Center 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.16
South 0.28 0.17 0.19 0.16
Obs. 3058 2995 871 1272 316 379 608 371 1263 973
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Table B.25: Test for potential experience at start - Groups 87-88 and 91-92
North high Center high South high Italy low
cl1 0.614 1.000 0.075 0.009
cl2 0.097 0.139 0.162 0.554
cl3 0.333 0.167 1.000 0.372
P-values of the Pearson’s χ2 test for experience at start, for the subgroups of analysis and starting class. The
null hypothesis is the equality of the probability distribution of experience at start between subgroups.
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Table B.26: Comparison of wage mobility - Groups 88-87 and 91-92
(a) Short run: periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff 0.024** -0.068 0.008 -0.019
p-value 0.005 0.285 0.827 0.382
class 1 to 3 diff 0.005 0.044 0.007 0.003
p-value 0.195 0.253 0.725 0.742
class 2 to 1 diff 0.020 -0.009 0.096 -0.017
p-value 0.215 0.827 0.053 0.781
class 2 to 3 diff 0.023 0.110** 0.023 -0.037
p-value 0.105 0.042 0.665 0.486
(b) Long run: periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff -0.026 0.046 -0.044 0.075
p-value 0.755 0.495 0.327 0.002
class 1 to 3 diff -0.049** -0.117** -0.022 -0.033
p-value 0.035 0.041 0.484 0.098*
class 2 to 1 diff 0.009 0.111** 0.047 0.020
p-value 0.190 0.013 0.270 0.654
class 2 to 3 diff -0.062** -0.120** 0.092 -0.112
p-value 0.000 0.060 0.134 0.119
(c) Successive years: periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff -0.062** -0.002 -0.043 0.097**
p-value 0.025 0.981 0.424 0.003
class 1 to 3 diff -0.035** -0.071 -0.007 -0.030
p-value 0.005 0.185 0.831 0.200
class 2 to 1 diff 0.029** 0.058 0.078** 0.011
p-value 0.005 0.104 0.067 0.618
class 2 to 3 diff -0.046** -0.096 0.005 -0.077**
p-value 0.000 0.117 0.917 0.028
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 87-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 91-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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B.5.6 Analyzing wage mobility on the same period
In our analysis we compare wage mobility between the two groups in terms of potential expe-
rience. As consequence, we compare the wage mobility over different periods with a shift of
four years between them. For example, when we compare wage mobility of period 1989-1999 for
group 86-88 with that of period 1993-2003 for group 90-92, the two periods of analysis overlap
from 1993 to 1999 and do not overlap from 1989 to 1992 and from 2000 to 2003. The results of
our analysis could be affected by the different economic conditions the two groups face in these
different periods. We argued above that this should not be a relevant problem for our analysis.
We run a robustness check to support our argument: we compare wage mobility between the
two groups on the common period 2000-2004. Since we are comparing the two groups on the
same period, we should consider that group 86-88 will have four years of potential experience
more than group 90-92. This difference in potential experience would most probably affect the
results at the beginning of the working career where wage mobility is higher, but we can expect
a decreasing effect in time. We choose period 2000-2004, the last four years period available, in
order to reduce the effect of the difference in potential experience on wage mobility (11 years
for group 86-88, 7 for group 90-92).
We present the results in Table B.27. We can see from the Table that group 90-92 has a more
positive wage mobility in the period. In particular the results on the transition probabilities
from the second class are in line with those from our analysis. We can conclude that also when
considering a common period, it seems that the group of individuals who enter during the high
unemployment phase faces a worse wage mobility.
This outcome importantly strengthen the finding of a persistent negative effect of adverse entry
conditions.
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 2 78
Table B.27: Comparison of wage mobility on the same period 00-04.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff -0.048** -0.063 -0.001 0.001
p-value 0.050 0.220 0.735 0.969
class 1 to 3 diff 0.002 0.065** -0.033** 0.009
p-value 0.065 0.030 0.015 0.653
class 2 to 1 diff 0.023** 0.015 0.007 0.013
p-value 0.035 0.400 0.390 0.415
class 2 to 3 diff -0.040** -0.106** -0.032** 0.001
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.974
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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B.5.7 Excluding low unemployment period 2001-2003
To show that our results are not driven by the low unemployment phase between 2001 and 2003,
we study wage mobility on the first 7 years of potential experience: on periods 1989-1996 and
1993-2000 for groups 86-88 and 90-92 respectively.
The results in Table B.28 are similar to those of the long run original analysis in terms of the
signs and the significance of the differences between the two groups transition probabilities.
Table B.28: Comparison of wage mobility - Periods 89-96 and 93-00 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.025
p-value 0.335 0.430 0.415 0.211
class 1 to 3 diff -0.067** -0.027 -0.044** -0.027**
p-value 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.050
class 2 to 1 diff 0.038** 0.051** 0.041** 0.038
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.294
class 2 to 3 diff -0.090** 0.028* -0.026** -0.092*
p-value 0.000 0.075 0.020 0.064
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 86-88 (high un-
employment) minus group 90-92 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
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B.5.8 Investigating a different period of high unemployment
We run the analysis comparing the wage mobility of the low unemployment group with the next
higher unemployment group available. Since in the data there is not an increase of the national
unemployment rate comparable to the decrease of the original analysis (4%), we consider the
unemployment rate in the single geographic areas and take group 91-93 as the low unemployment
one and group 95-97 as the high. In this way subgroup South has a comparable increase of
unemployment: the average rate passes from 34.66% to 38.80%. In the Centre it passes from
20.33% to 23.85%, while in the North it remains stable in the two periods (from 14.92% to
14.63%).2
It should be noticed that a reform of the labor market (Treu) took place in 1997. The aim of
the reform was to increase the flexibility of the labor market introducing temporary contracts
and internships. Since the wage mobility of group 95-97 is probably affected by the different
institutional framework, the results between this and the original analysis are not completely
comparable. Still we can obtain some evidence to support the causality of unemployment at
entry on different wage mobility.
In Table B.29 it can be seen that there is a lower proportion of Managers and White Collars
in group 95-97 than 91-93 and a higher proportion of Apprentices. The demographic analysis
in Table B.30 rejects the null of equality in distribution of occupation in all subgroups, except
Italy, low education. We find similar results both in the original analysis and in the analysis on
groups 87-89 and 91-93 above. In both cases conditioning on age reduces the inequalities, so we
use our conditional test for all high education subgroups.
We also run the demographic analysis between groups 87-89 and 95-97 to check to what extent
we can compare the results with those of the analysis on groups 87-89 and 91-93. Tables B.31
and B.32 show similar demographic characteristics between the two groups for subgroups North
and South high education. Instead, Center high education seems to have a different occupation
distribution in the two groups and Italy low education to have a different age and regional
structure, besides an increase in unemployment of just 2.17%. For these reasons the results of
subgroups North and South, high education are more comparable to the previous, and we focus
on them in our analysis.
We can consider maximum six years of potential experience in the analysis on wage mobility. The
results are reported in Table B.33. In subgroup South, high education, as expected, we find a
better six year wage mobility for the low unemployment group 91-93: all the upward probabilities
of the analysis have a negative sign and 2 out of 3 are significant at 5%. The differences in the
transition probabilities for subgroup North, high education are small in magnitude and not
2The evolution of the young male unemployment rate in the three areas is presented in Figure B.1 in the
Appendix.
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significant at 5% except the one from class 1 to 3. This result seems to strengthen the causality
of the entry conditions in the analysis of groups 87-89 and 91-93: with a similar group to 87-89,
the lack of a variation in the unemployment rate coincides with no difference in the income
mobility.
In conclusion the analysis with groups 91-93 and 95-97 gives some evidence that the difference
in wage mobility we find in the original analysis is caused by the labor market entry conditions.
However, when taking into account these results, it should be considered that the institutional
framework changes in 1997, that the increase in unemployment rate that we are using is not
national and that we cannot perform the ten years analysis.
Table B.29: Comparison of the proportion of the different types of first occupation, education, first area of work for groups
95-97 91-93, and sample sizes.
Italy whole North high Center high South high Italy low
95-97 91-93 95-97 91-93 91-93 91-93 95-97 91-93 95-97 91-93
Apprentices 0.38 0.33 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.90 0.86
Blue collars 0.48 0.47 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.59 0.74 0.69 0.09 0.13
Man. & White collars 0.14 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.18 0.33 0.14 0.26 0.01 0.01
Low 0.31 0.32
High 0.69 0.68
North 0.68 0.66 0.71 0.69
Center 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17
South 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.14
Obs. 3174 3727 1434 1630 388 454 356 435 996 1208
Table B.31: Comparison of the proportion of the different types of first occupation, education, first area of work for groups
87-89 95-97, and sample sizes.
Italy whole North high Center high South high Italy low
87-89 95-97 87-89 95-97 87-89 95-97 87-89 95-97 87-89 95-97
Apprentices 0.38 0.38 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.03 0.12 0.87 0.90
Blue collars 0.45 0.48 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.67 0.77 0.74 0.12 0.09
Man. & White collars 0.17 0.14 0.31 0.23 0.33 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.01 0.01
Low 0.40 0.31
High 0.60 0.69
North 0.58 0.68 0.68 0.71
Center 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15
South 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.13
Obs. 4482 3174 1381 1434 503 388 819 356 1779 996
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Table B.33: Comparison of wage mobility - Periods 98-04 and 94-00 respectively.
High educ. Low Education
Prob North Centre South Italy
class 1 to 2 diff -0.014* 0.190** -0.076** -0.010
p-value 0.095 0.000 0.005 0.657
class 1 to 3 diff 0.054** -0.033 -0.010 0.012
p-value 0.005 0.115 0.705 0.457
class 2 to 1 diff -0.002 -0.033 -0.038 -0.075*
p-value 0.435 0.105 0.140 0.081
class 2 to 3 diff 0.003 0.081** -0.082** -0.062
p-value 0.185 0.020 0.025 0.269
The tables present the difference between the transition probabilities from group 95-97 (high un-
employment) minus group 91-93 (low unemployment). The p-values for high education columns
are from the conditional test considering age, the ones for low education are from the unconditional
test. Differences marked * or ** are significant around 10% and at 5% respectively.
B.6 Complementary Material - Extra tables
B.6.1 Data
Table B.34: Final sample size for each year.
year n. individuals n. new workers n. male new workers
1986 121110 6700 3971
1987 117475 5896 3461
1988 116371 5976 3384
1989 116290 5841 3261
1990 116513 5817 3308
1991 118676 5836 3320
1992 119488 5321 3002
1993 115171 3965 2241
1994 111830 3912 2172
1995 112034 4035 2248
1996 113120 3917 2211
1997 109910 3717 2086
1998 107133 4291 2392
1999 108492 4391 2431
2000 114419 4888 2788
2001 117151 4271 2408
2002 121325 4295 2469
2003 126383 4553 2807
2004 128787 3289 2026
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B.6.2 Demographic analysis
Table B.35: Occupation distribution, North, high education
Cl Group Apprentices Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.18 0.73 0.09 0.00
1 2 0.16 0.75 0.10 0.00
2 1 0.04 0.71 0.25 0.00
2 2 0.03 0.67 0.30 0.00
3 1 0.01 0.44 0.55 0.00
3 2 0.01 0.43 0.55 0.01
all cl. 1 0.07 0.64 0.29 0.00
all cl. 2 0.06 0.62 0.32 0.00
Table B.36: Chi-square test on occupation distribution, North, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 3.482 0.521
cl2 5.884 0.093
cl3 4.296 0.352
all cl. 8.151 0.059
Table B.37: Occupation distribution without Apprentices, North, high education
Cl Group Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.88 0.11 0.00
1 2 0.89 0.11 0.00
2 1 0.74 0.26 0.00
2 2 0.69 0.31 0.00
3 1 0.44 0.55 0.00
3 2 0.44 0.56 0.01
all cl. 1 0.69 0.31 0.00
all cl. 2 0.66 0.34 0.00
Table B.38: Chi-square test on occupation distribution without Apprentices, North, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 2.831 0.453
cl2 4.509 0.063
cl3 4.259 0.209
all cl. 6.902 0.048
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Table B.39: Occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, North, high education
Cl Group Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.88 0.12 0.00
1 2 0.89 0.11 0.00
2 1 0.75 0.25 0.00
2 2 0.70 0.30 0.00
3 1 0.44 0.55 0.00
3 2 0.44 0.55 0.01
all cl. 1 0.70 0.30 0.00
all cl. 2 0.67 0.32 0.00
Table B.40: Chi-square test on occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, North, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 2.859 0.407
cl2 5.588 0.039
cl3 4.242 0.217
all cl. 7.065 0.053
Table B.41: Kolmogorov Smirnov test on age distribution, North, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 0.122 0.005
cl2 0.177 0.000
cl3 0.088 0.074
all cl. 0.132 0.000
Table B.42: Occupation distribution, Center, high education
Cl Group Apprentices Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.11 0.73 0.16
1 2 0.15 0.71 0.14
2 1 0.03 0.69 0.28
2 2 0.01 0.65 0.33
3 1 0.03 0.38 0.58 0.01
3 2 0.00 0.41 0.59 0.00
all cl. 1 0.06 0.62 0.32 0.00
all cl. 2 0.05 0.60 0.35 0.00
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Table B.43: Chi-square test on occupation distribution, Center, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 1.553 0.459
cl2 3.459 0.193
cl3 7.404 0.037
all cl. 3.114 0.393
Table B.44: Occupation distribution without Apprentices, Center, high education
Cl Group Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.82 0.18
1 2 0.83 0.17
2 1 0.71 0.29
2 2 0.66 0.34
3 1 0.39 0.60 0.01
3 2 0.41 0.59 0.00
all cl. 1 0.66 0.34 0.00
all cl. 2 0.63 0.37 0.00
Table B.45: Chi-square test on occupation distribution without Apprentices, Center, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 0.140 0.775
cl2 1.460 0.268
cl3 2.594 0.306
all cl. 2.988 0.217
Table B.46: Occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, Center, high education
Cl Group Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.81 0.18 0.01
1 2 0.84 0.16 0.00
2 1 0.72 0.28
2 2 0.67 0.33
3 1 0.39 0.59 0.01
3 2 0.41 0.59 0.00
all cl. 1 0.66 0.33 0.01
all cl. 2 0.65 0.35 0.00
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Table B.47: Chi-square test on occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, Center, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 1.363 0.515
cl2 1.523 0.221
cl3 2.488 0.340
all cl. 3.768 0.150
Table B.48: Kolmogorov Smirnov test on age distribution, Center, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 0.059 0.924
cl2 0.119 0.082
cl3 0.159 0.046
all cl. 0.105 0.005
Table B.49: Occupation distribution, South, high education
Cl Group Apprentices Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.07 0.85 0.08 0.00
1 2 0.08 0.80 0.12 0.00
2 1 0.03 0.74 0.23
2 2 0.04 0.64 0.32
3 1 0.43 0.55 0.02
3 2 0.45 0.55 0.00
all cl. 1 0.05 0.77 0.18 0.00
all cl. 2 0.06 0.70 0.25 0.00
Table B.50: Chi-square test on occupation distribution, South, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 6.430 0.121
cl2 5.738 0.057
cl3 1.484 0.568
all cl. 12.903 0.007
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Table B.51: Occupation distribution without Apprentices, South, high education
Cl Group Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.91 0.08 0.00
1 2 0.87 0.13 0.00
2 1 0.76 0.24
2 2 0.66 0.34
3 1 0.43 0.55 0.02
3 2 0.45 0.55 0.00
all cl. 1 0.81 0.19 0.00
all cl. 2 0.74 0.26 0.00
Table B.52: Chi-square test on occupation distribution without Apprentices, South, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 6.129 0.051
cl2 5.247 0.020
cl3 1.484 0.588
all cl. 12.571 0.001
Table B.53: Occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, South, high education
Cl Group Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.92 0.08 0.00
1 2 0.88 0.12 0.00
2 1 0.77 0.23
2 2 0.67 0.33
3 1 0.43 0.55 0.02
3 2 0.45 0.55 0.00
all cl. 1 0.81 0.18 0.00
all cl. 2 0.75 0.25 0.00
Table B.54: Chi-square test on occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, South, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 5.008 0.115
cl2 5.005 0.038
cl3 1.484 0.595
all cl. 11.465 0.002
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Table B.55: Kolmogorov Smirnov test on age distribution, South, high education
test stat p-value
cl1 0.036 0.959
cl2 0.044 0.981
cl3 0.068 0.986
all cl. 0.045 0.474
Table B.56: Occupation distribution, Italy, low education
Cl Group Apprentices Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.89 0.10 0.00 0.00
1 2 0.89 0.11 0.00 0.00
2 1 0.63 0.34 0.03
2 2 0.63 0.35 0.01
3 1 0.50 0.47 0.03
3 2 0.72 0.22 0.06
all cl. 1 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.00
all cl. 2 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00
Table B.57: Chi-square test on occupation distribution, Italy, low education
test stat p-value
cl1 2.593 0.710
cl2 2.313 0.320
cl3 2.993 0.215
all cl. 4.321 0.372
Table B.58: Occupation distribution without Apprentices, Italy, low education
Cl Group Blue collars Executives Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01
1 2 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00
2 1 0.91 0.09
2 2 0.97 0.03
3 1 0.94 0.06
3 2 0.80 0.20
all cl. 1 0.95 0.01 0.04 0.00
all cl. 2 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.00
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Table B.59: Chi-square test on occupation distribution without Apprentices, Italy, low education
test stat p-value
cl1 2.593 0.616
cl2 2.305 0.184
cl3 0.836 0.409
all cl. 4.043 0.256
Table B.60: Occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, Italy, low education
Cl Group Blue collars Managers & white collars Others
1 1 0.97 0.03 0.00
1 2 0.97 0.03 0.00
2 1 0.93 0.07
2 2 0.95 0.05
3 1 0.97 0.03
3 2 0.89 0.11
all cl. 1 0.96 0.03 0.00
all cl. 2 0.97 0.03 0.00
Table B.61: Chi-square test on occupation distribution replacing Apprentices, Italy, low education
test stat p-value
cl1 4.876 0.189
cl2 0.700 0.505
cl3 1.303 0.542
all cl. 4.623 0.208
Table B.62: Kolmogorov Smirnov test on age distribution, Italy, low education
test stat p-value
cl1 0.031 0.512
cl2 0.060 0.867
cl3 0.295 0.268
all cl. 0.026 0.651
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Table B.63: Area of work distribution, Italy, low education
Cl Group North Center South
1 1 0.64 0.16 0.19
1 2 0.67 0.17 0.16
2 1 0.72 0.12 0.15
2 2 0.78 0.14 0.07
3 1 0.66 0.09 0.25
3 2 0.78 0.17 0.06
all cl. 1 0.65 0.16 0.19
all cl. 2 0.68 0.17 0.15
Table B.64: Chi-square test on area of work, Italy, low education
test stat p-value
cl1 4.253 0.114
cl2 5.917 0.056
cl3 3.173 0.212
all cl. 8.246 0.017
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B.6.3 Analysis Tables
Table B.65: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, North, high education, periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
(a) Transition prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.45 0.46 0.10 350
1/3-2/3 0.10 0.56 0.34 723
>2/3 0.03 0.12 0.85 363
(b) Transition prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.46 0.44 0.10 481
1/3-2/3 0.07 0.56 0.37 854
>2/3 0.03 0.12 0.85 517
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 -0.02 0.01 0.00
1/3-2/3 0.03 0.00 -0.03
>2/3 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.651 0.682 0.942
1/3-2/3 0.038 0.942 0.200
>2/3 0.767 0.947 0.841
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.475 0.170 0.290
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.145 0.005
>2/3 0.020 0.745 0.210
Table B.66: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, Center, high education, periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
(a) Transition prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.55 0.36 0.09 171
1/3-2/3 0.15 0.49 0.35 217
>2/3 0.03 0.12 0.85 138
(b) Transition prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.53 0.39 0.09 176
1/3-2/3 0.16 0.60 0.24 237
>2/3 0.02 0.16 0.82 164
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.02 -0.02 0.00
1/3-2/3 -0.00 -0.11 0.11
>2/3 0.01 -0.04 0.02
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.691 0.647 0.934
1/3-2/3 0.905 0.018 0.007
>2/3 0.546 0.376 0.564
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.280 0.120 0.080
1/3-2/3 0.095 0.000 0.000
>2/3 0.230 0.000 0.050
Table B.67: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, South, high education, periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.64 0.30 0.05 557
1/3-2/3 0.24 0.55 0.21 295
>2/3 0.06 0.23 0.71 110
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.68 0.27 0.05 297
1/3-2/3 0.20 0.59 0.21 180
>2/3 0.06 0.13 0.81 77
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 -0.03 0.03 -0.00
1/3-2/3 0.04 -0.04 -0.00
>2/3 -0.00 0.10 -0.10
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.315 0.292 0.999
1/3-2/3 0.257 0.356 0.981
>2/3 0.972 0.078 0.124
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.030 0.045 0.185
1/3-2/3 0.005 0.020 0.225
>2/3 0.355 0.045 0.020
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Table B.68: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, Italy, low education, periods 89-93 and 93-97 respectively.
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.60 0.35 0.05 1558
1/3-2/3 0.21 0.61 0.17 229
>2/3 0.31 0.38 0.31 32
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.57 0.38 0.05 1250
1/3-2/3 0.21 0.62 0.17 175
>2/3 0.11 0.33 0.56 18
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.04 -0.04 0.00
1/3-2/3 0.00 -0.01 0.01
>2/3 0.20 0.04 -0.24
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.056 0.048 0.955
1/3-2/3 0.951 0.814 0.812
>2/3 0.068 0.766 0.089
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.005 0.000 0.950
1/3-2/3 0.665 0.215 0.305
>2/3 0.000 0.355 0.000
Table B.69: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, North, high education, periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.26 0.45 0.29 305
1/3-2/3 0.09 0.35 0.56 600
>2/3 0.02 0.09 0.89 304
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.19 0.48 0.33 417
1/3-2/3 0.06 0.30 0.64 794
>2/3 0.01 0.09 0.90 430
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.07 -0.04 -0.04
1/3-2/3 0.03 0.05 -0.08
>2/3 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.022 0.348 0.290
1/3-2/3 0.049 0.041 0.002
>2/3 0.554 0.893 0.898
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.000 0.285 0.005
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.000 0.000
>2/3 0.265 0.070 0.445
Table B.70: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, Center, high education, periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.32 0.50 0.18 153
1/3-2/3 0.15 0.45 0.40 167
>2/3 0.03 0.10 0.87 110
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.29 0.42 0.30 182
1/3-2/3 0.06 0.44 0.50 218
>2/3 0.03 0.09 0.87 149
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.03 0.08 -0.11
1/3-2/3 0.09 0.01 -0.09
>2/3 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.493 0.146 0.014
1/3-2/3 0.008 0.864 0.064
>2/3 0.769 0.871 0.995
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.225 0.025 0.000
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.415 0.005
>2/3 0.075 0.195 0.020
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Table B.71: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, South, high education, periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.44 0.44 0.12 421
1/3-2/3 0.17 0.48 0.34 230
>2/3 0.06 0.17 0.77 87
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.39 0.46 0.15 308
1/3-2/3 0.12 0.55 0.33 174
>2/3 0.06 0.13 0.81 68
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.05 -0.01 -0.03
1/3-2/3 0.05 -0.06 0.01
>2/3 -0.00 0.04 -0.04
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.198 0.715 0.191
1/3-2/3 0.130 0.206 0.831
>2/3 0.972 0.487 0.555
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.000 0.285 0.000
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.005 0.210
>2/3 0.025 0.335 0.030
Table B.72: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, Italy, low education, periods 89-99 and 93-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.26 0.53 0.21 1304
1/3-2/3 0.12 0.50 0.38 213
>2/3 0.15 0.44 0.41 27
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.28 0.48 0.24 1174
1/3-2/3 0.09 0.44 0.47 155
>2/3 0.11 0.39 0.50 18
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 -0.01 0.05 -0.04
1/3-2/3 0.03 0.06 -0.09
>2/3 0.04 0.06 -0.09
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.496 0.014 0.026
1/3-2/3 0.396 0.262 0.099
>2/3 0.713 0.710 0.540
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.515 0.000 0.000
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.030 0.000
>2/3 0.005 0.195 0.120
Table B.73: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, North, high education, periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.38 0.45 0.17 212
1/3-2/3 0.08 0.46 0.45 608
>2/3 0.01 0.08 0.91 577
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.29 0.52 0.19 242
1/3-2/3 0.06 0.44 0.50 674
>2/3 0.01 0.07 0.91 719
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.08 -0.07 -0.02
1/3-2/3 0.03 0.02 -0.05
>2/3 -0.00 0.01 -0.01
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.058 0.148 0.653
1/3-2/3 0.070 0.468 0.099
>2/3 0.950 0.605 0.646
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.000 0.000 0.135
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.005 0.000
>2/3 0.805 0.115 0.145
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Table B.74: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, Center, high education, periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.41 0.48 0.11 118
1/3-2/3 0.10 0.58 0.32 189
>2/3 0.03 0.12 0.85 185
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.39 0.43 0.19 122
1/3-2/3 0.05 0.55 0.41 222
>2/3 0.02 0.03 0.94 174
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.02 0.06 -0.08
1/3-2/3 0.05 0.04 -0.09
>2/3 0.00 0.09 -0.09
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.733 0.376 0.086
1/3-2/3 0.052 0.451 0.063
>2/3 0.806 0.001 0.003
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.395 0.020 0.010
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.485 0.000
>2/3 0.580 0.000 0.000
Table B.75: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, South, high education, periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.53 0.39 0.08 318
1/3-2/3 0.20 0.57 0.23 297
>2/3 0.03 0.20 0.77 158
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.51 0.40 0.09 211
1/3-2/3 0.12 0.60 0.28 207
>2/3 0.02 0.13 0.85 103
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.02 -0.01 -0.02
1/3-2/3 0.08 -0.03 -0.05
>2/3 0.01 0.07 -0.08
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.583 0.851 0.521
1/3-2/3 0.016 0.550 0.196
>2/3 0.530 0.124 0.088
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.020 0.190 0.085
1/3-2/3 0.000 0.065 0.000
>2/3 0.025 0.005 0.005
Table B.76: Analysis groups 86-88, 90-92, Italy, low education, periods 93-99 and 97-03 respectively
(a) Transiton prob. 86-88
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.33 0.55 0.12 739
1/3-2/3 0.10 0.59 0.31 630
>2/3 0.04 0.24 0.72 123
(b) Transiton prob. 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3 tot cl.
<1/3 0.37 0.48 0.15 586
1/3-2/3 0.10 0.53 0.37 520
>2/3 0.06 0.25 0.69 84
(c) Diff 86-88 minus 90-92
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 -0.03 0.07 -0.03
1/3-2/3 0.00 0.05 -0.05
>2/3 -0.02 -0.01 0.03
(d) Unconditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.193 0.017 0.099
1/3-2/3 0.929 0.073 0.053
>2/3 0.547 0.815 0.608
(e) Conditional Test p-val.
<1/3 1/3-2/3 >2/3
<1/3 0.065 0.000 0.000
1/3-2/3 0.215 0.000 0.000
>2/3 0.045 0.695 0.125
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C.1 Other Estimates
Table C.1: Difference analysis. Other parameters.
Dependent variable:
log weekly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Centre −0.055 0.005 −0.055 −0.013
(0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.054)
South −0.097∗∗∗ −0.029 −0.097∗∗∗ −0.052
(0.036) (0.044) (0.037) (0.043)
n. spells −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
n. migrations −0.036 −0.032 −0.035 −0.031
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
age sq. −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
actual exp. 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
actual exp sq. 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
tenure 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tenure sq −0.00004∗∗∗ −0.00004∗∗∗ −0.00004∗∗∗ −0.00004∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
part-time −0.075∗∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.075∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Blue Collars 0.236∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Executives 0.557∗∗ 0.556∗∗ 0.563∗∗ 0.563∗∗
(0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250)
Managers & White C. 0.321∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Others 0.276∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.281∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
Craftsmanship −0.050∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Credit,Insurance,Fiscal 0.269∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076)
Commerce,Arts,Professions −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.001 −0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
d88 −0.076∗ −0.080∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.087∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
d89 −0.087∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.089∗∗ −0.100∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
d90 0.019 0.015 0.018 0.009
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
d91 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.002
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
d92 0.016 0.009 0.013 0.003
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
d93 −0.002 −0.006 −0.002 −0.009
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Centre×d88 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Centre×d89 0.114∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Centre×d90 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.003 −0.004
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Centre×d91 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.022
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Centre×d92 0.049 0.049 0.047 0.042
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Centre×d93 0.097∗ 0.095∗ 0.096∗ 0.095∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
South×d88 0.030 0.031 0.027 0.028
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
South×d89 0.102∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
South×d90 0.028 0.036 0.029 0.036
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
South×d91 0.015 0.020 0.017 0.020
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
South×d92 0.091∗ 0.094∗ 0.093∗ 0.094∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
South×d93 0.106∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Constant 0.792∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.121) (0.117) (0.117)
R2 0.226 0.228 0.228 0.232
Adj. R2 0.223 0.225 0.224 0.228
Num. obs. 2818 2818 2818 2818
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variable is the difference between the log weekly wage at experience 11 minus log weekly wage
at experience 1. For dummies, the reference area is North, year is 1987, occupation is Apprentices, sector is
Industry.
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Table C.2: Dynamic fixed effects model. Other parameters.
Dependent variable:
log weekly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wt−1 0.431∗∗∗ 0.294 0.436∗∗∗ 0.312∗
(0.113) (0.153) (0.113) (0.152)
wt−2 −0.034 −0.041 −0.037 −0.050
(0.074) (0.097) (0.074) (0.096)
n. spells −0.021∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
n. migration −0.005 0.007 −0.001 0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
age 0.101∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
age sq. −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
actual exp. −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
part-time 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Centre −0.027 −0.028 −0.023 −0.026
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
South −0.041 −0.051∗ −0.035 −0.047∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Blue collars 0.033∗∗∗ 0.046 0.032∗∗∗ 0.044
(0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.026)
Executives 0.046 −1.243 0.046 −1.327
(0.068) (5.054) (0.068) (5.016)
Managers & White C. 0.046∗∗∗ 0.060 0.047∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.013) (0.043) (0.013) (0.043)
Others 0.032 0.061 0.033 0.057
(0.057) (0.053) (0.058) (0.053)
Craftsmanship −0.016∗ −0.015 −0.016∗ −0.016
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Credit,Insurance,Fiscal Service 0.078 0.059 0.077 0.059
(0.076) (0.067) (0.075) (0.067)
Commerce,Arts,Professions −0.017 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
n 8965 8965 8965 8965
T 18 18 18 18
Num. obs. 128273 128273 128273 128273
Num. obs. used 26888 17600 26888 17600
Sargan Test: chisq 73.572 47.048 73.320 48.143
Sargan Test: df 63 57 63 57
Sargan Test: p-value 0.170 0.824 0.176 0.792
Wald Test Coefficients: chisq 3791.321 1264.983 3791.954 1284.390
Wald Test Coefficients: df 21 29 23 39
Wald Test Coefficients: p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Autocorrelation test (1): normal -3.245 -2.115 -3.266 -2.211
Autocorrelation test (1): p-value 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.027
Autocorrelation test (2): normal -1.136 -0.512 -1.104 -0.402
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Autocorrelation test (2): p-value 0.256 0.608 0.270 0.688
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Arellano-Bond estimator with lags 3 to 7 as instruments. For dummies, the reference area is North, occupation
is Apprentices, sector is Industry.
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